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Establish Standards for Indigent Defense
Jennifer M. Allent
Introduction
On September 15, 1998, Ricky Mallory and two co-defendants
were tried for aggravated assault, attempted murder, and other
crimes.1  Mallory was found guilty and subsequently filed a
petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).2 He alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel because he had waived his right to
a jury trial without the trial court conducting a specific oral jury
waiver colloquy, and his attorney failed to object to the oversight.3
The PCRA court granted Mallory a new trial, 4 but the Superior
Court reversed due to his failure to establish prejudice. 5 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with the Superior Court that
Mallory was required to show prejudice 6 and that the PCRA court
had not conducted adequate fact-finding under the appropriate
standard. 7 On October 6, 2008, the United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari in Pennsylvania v. Mallory.8
Had the Supreme Court taken this case, it would have had an
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1. Commonwealth v. Mallory, 941 A.2d 686, 689-91 (Pa. 2008).
2. Id. at 689, 691.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 689, 692-93.
5. Id. at 689, 693.
6. Id. at 701-02, 704.
7. Id. at 704 ("[T]o prove prejudice, [a defendant] must demonstrate a
reasonable probability that but for counsel's constitutionally deficient service, the
outcome of the waiver proceeding would have been different, i.e., that he [or she]
would not have waived his [or her] right to a jury trial.").
8. Pennsylvania v. Mallory, 129 S. Ct. 257 (2008).
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opportunity to supply much-needed guidance regarding an
indigent's right to effective assistance of counsel, as established in
Gideon v. Wainwright9 and Strickland v. Washington.10 Instead,
the Court chose to remain silent, continuing to let stand vague and
inadequate standards that fail to protect one of the most
fundamental rights in America's criminal justice system.
It is nothing new in legal scholarship to say that the criminal
justice system often disadvantages and short-changes criminal
defendants.11 While Americans contentedly fall back on the
maxims that we are innocent until proven guilty and are each
entitled to our day in court, those knowledgeable in our criminal
justice system know that these statements have long since ceased
to describe the true state of affairs for criminal defendants.
Nowhere are these failings more evident-and more important-
than in our indigent defense services.
Under the Sixth Amendment, United States citizens are
entitled to "the Assistance of Counsel for . . . defence." 12 The Fifth
Amendment provides that citizens may not be deprived of "life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law... ."13 These
provisions are also specifically imposed on state governments by
the Fourteenth Amendment.14 Taken together, these
constitutional provisions are intended to ensure fair trials, and
preserve defendants' fundamental rights. 15 The Supreme Court,
9. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
10. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
11. See, e.g., Andrew M. Siegel, Moving Down the Wedge of Injustice: A Proposal
for a Third Generation of Wrongful Convictions Scholarship and Advocacy, 42 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1219 (2005) (arguing that recent developments in forensic technology
and movements such as the Innocence Project have revealed shocking instances of
wrongful convictions, but over time have inured the American public to the
outrageous incidence of wrongful convictions and diverted attention from systemic
flaws in our criminal justice system that actually drive most wrongful convictions);
cf. Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We
Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1393, 1321 (1997)
(asserting that the American criminal justice system's structure "operates, both
informally and formally, on the assumption that formally charged individuals are
guilty" and "creates a significant risk that innocent people will be systematically
convicted").
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
13. Id. amend. V.
14. See id. amend. XIV, § 1; see generally Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 777
(2003) (noting that the text of the Fifth Amendment applied to the criminal case at
hand through the doctrine of Fourteenth Amendment incorporation) (Souter, J.,
concurring); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) ("[A] provision of the
Bill of Rights which is 'fundamental and essential to a fair trial' is made obligatory
upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment .... [The Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of counsel is ... one of these fundamental rights.").
15. Cf. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 341-45 (discussing the Supreme Court's history of
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however, has been remarkably reticent to clearly define how to
implement these rights in order to achieve their aims.' 6
Unfortunately, the silence is particularly deafening when it comes
to those most at risk of being shortchanged by the criminal justice
system: the indigent.
Combined with the rights attendant to a fair and impartial
tribunal, the right to present an effective defense is likely the most
fundamental for an indigent defendant, and is the most vulnerable
to being undermined. 17 The effective defense right is comprised of
two essential elements: the right to effective assistance of
counsel' 8 and the right to produce and present evidence on one's
behalf. 1 9 The Supreme Court's holdings in both of these areas are
indefensibly sparse.
In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court held that
indigent defendants are entitled to the assistance of counsel,
whether they are charged in state or federal court, in order to "be
assured a fair trial."20  In Strickland v. Washington, the Court
elaborated that this counsel need not only be present, but must
also be "effective." 2' The Strickland Court set standards for
incorporating certain provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, its standard that those rights be of a "fundamental
nature" in order to warrant incorporation, and the Court's decisions in Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), and the case at
bar, which hinged on whether the right to appointment of counsel is "fundamental
and essential to a fair trial").
16. See infra notes 25-26, 29-30 and accompanying text.
17. Cf. Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address Underfunded
Indigent Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1732 (2005) [hereinafter
Effectively Ineffective] (asserting that funding is unlikely to arise under the
Strickland test for evaluating effective assistance of counsel because the test is
ends-, rather than means-oriented); Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No
Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of
Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625 (1986) (arguing that there are dim prospects
for the adequate funding of indigent defense, which severely undermines Sixth
Amendment rights); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Tuning Up Gideon's Trumpet, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 1461 (2003) (maintaining that in the wake of the September 11,
2001 attacks the American public has allowed a defendant's right to counsel to be
compromised because citizens do not understand the seriousness of the right).
18. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel
because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of
the adversarial system to produce just results. An accused is entitled to be
assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who plays the role
necessary to ensure that the trial is fair.
Id.
19. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) ("[Flundamental fairness
entitles indigent defendants to 'an adequate opportunity to present their claims
fairly within the adversary system ....") (citation omitted).
20. 372 U.S. at 344.
21. 466 U.S. at 685-86.
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determining when counsel is ineffective, and thus when a
defendant can challenge his or her conviction or sentence for being
denied the representation to which he or she is entitled. 22 The
Court addressed a defendant's ability to present evidence,
specifically access to expert witnesses, in Ake v. Oklahoma.23 In
Ake, the Court found that States must provide access to
psychiatric experts when the defendant's sanity at the time of an
offense is in question.24
Since these landmark decisions, the Supreme Court has
failed to expand on or clarify its standards for the resources due to
indigent defendants in preparing and presenting their cases.
Mallory25 is only the most recent opportunity to refine Gideon and
Strickland that the Court has declined. The Court has
consistently proven exceedingly reluctant to revisit its holdings on
indigent defense, even in extreme and obvious cases of counsel's
incompetence. 26
The Court's expert witness jurisprudence has fared no better.
In 2006 the Court denied certiorari in Moore v. Maryland.27 In
Moore, the defendant requested a DNA expert to help him present
a defense against first degree murder charges. 28 Had it granted
22. Id. at 687 (stating that courts must determine effectiveness by judging
"whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result"); see
infra Part I.B.
23. 470 U.S. 68.
24. Id. at 74.
25. Pennsylvania v. Mallory, 129 S. Ct. 257 (2008); see supra notes 8-10 and
accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (per
curiam), reh'g denied, 928 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert. denied sub nom.
McFarland v. Texas, 519 U.S. 1119 (1997) (denying certiorari where the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Texas asserted that counsel's sleeping through parts of the
trial could have been a strategic move and held that the presence of counsel at all
times during trial, combined with a failure to show prejudice, cannot support a
finding that McFarland was ineffectively represented); Haney v. State, 603 So. 2d
368 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991), aff'd sub nor. Ex parte Haney, 603 So. 2d 412 (Ala.
1992), cert. denied sub nom. Haney v. Alabama, 507 U.S. 925 (1993) (denying
certiorari where the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the Alabama Criminal
Court of Appeals' finding that defendant's failure to attempt to meet with her
attorney after he had been held in contempt of court for being under the influence
of alcohol meant she had not been deprived of a constitutional right to counsel);
Smith v. Ylst, 826 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 829 (1988)
(denying certiorari where the Ninth Circuit upheld the trial court's denial of a new
trial, despite the defendant's presentation of psychiatric reports asserting that
defense counsel exhibited a paranoid psychotic reaction during trial, on the grounds
that the defendant failed to show specific errors constituting prejudice).
27. Moore v. State, 889 A.2d 325 (Md. 2005), cert. denied sub nom. Moore v.
Maryland, 549 U.S. 813 (2006).
28. Id. at 327, 329.
2009] FREE FOR ALL
certiorari, the Court would have had an opportunity to consider
the threshold showing necessary for a defendant to establish that
he or she is entitled to a state-funded expert. 29 But as with many
prior cases, 30 the Court declined to clarify its holding regarding
the extent to which defendants are entitled to experts to aid in
presenting their defenses.
Gideon, Strickland, and Ake each recognize and define
fundamental rights on their own. 31 But up to this point both
courts and scholars have tended to view them as representing two
separate and distinct rights---effective assistance of counsel and
expert assistance. This approach is flawed because neither right is
sufficient without the other. Defendants may have experts who
offer clear evidence of actual innocence, but their conclusions are
useless if defendants lack the technical assistance to ensure that
this evidence is properly presented to the court. And the best
defense attorney in the country cannot be a zealous advocate for
his or her client or present a legally sufficient defense without the
expert assistance necessary to make a case. We must acknowledge
that these rights are inextricably linked and begin to analyze the
impacts that the courts' treatment of one has on the other. Such
acknowledgement and analysis is necessary in order to advance
the dialogue of how we can provide indigent defendants with all
the services that they need in order to receive fair trials in United
States courtrooms.
29. See id. at 333-34.
30. See, e.g., Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 910 (1992) (denying certiorari where the lower court held that evidence of
mental disabilities dating from the time of the offense, but not discovered until
many years after the fact, did not demonstrate factual innocence so as to entitle the
defendant to habeas relief); State v. Vickers, 675 P.2d 710 (Ariz. 1983) (per curiam),
cert. denied sub nom. Vickers v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 1033 (1990), and reh'g denied,
497 U.S. 1050 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (explaining
that the trial court denied Vickers's request for diagnostic testing despite medical
opinions provided to the court that such testing was necessary); Johnson v. State,
731 P.2d 993 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 878 (1987) (Marshall,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (explaining that Johnson requested a
chemist's assistance in preparing his defense and that the trial court found such an
expert warranted, but denied the request on the basis that the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals had previously held that defendants are not always entitled to
such experts).
31. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text; see also Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The Court in Gideon stated:
From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws
have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards
designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every
defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized
if the poor man [or woman] charged with crime has to face his [or her]
accusers without a lawyer to assist him [or her].
372 U.S. at 344.
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Part I of this Article offers background on Gideon and
Strickland, explaining the standards that the Supreme Court has
provided for indigent defense requirements under the
Constitution. Part II discusses the Supreme Court's guidance on
indigent access to expert resources, as decided in Ake. Part III
addresses the shortcomings of the Gideon and Strickland decisions
and the impact the Court's insufficient guidance has had on
indigent defense throughout the nation. Part IV explains the
inadequacies of the Supreme Court's treatment of access to experts
and how States have performed under the Court's inadequate
direction. Finally, Part V explores the considerations that the
Court must take into account when it finally fulfills its obligation
to revisit Gideon, Strickland, and Ake to ensure meaningful and
constitutionally sufficient indigent defense.
I. The Accused Shall Enjoy the Right ...
Though the Sixth Amendment includes a right to counsel, 32
the extent of its guarantees have evolved over time as the
Supreme Court has expanded its view of the right. The Court first
moved toward recognizing a right to counsel for state court
defendants in Powell v. Alabama 33 (The Scottsboro Boys Case).34
In Powell, several African-American boys among a group charged
with raping two White girls appealed their convictions and death
sentences on the basis that they were denied counsel. 35 During
their trial, the judge had appointed "all members of the bar"36 to
be responsible for the defense; however, the defendants did not
meet with any attorney prior to their trial 37 and an attorney who
volunteered that day presented their defense. 38 After considering
the defendants' claims, the Supreme Court found that, under their
circumstances (being young, uneducated, away from their families,
and in a hostile environment),39 and because the defendants were
accused of a capital offense, 40 "the necessity of counsel was so vital
32. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his [or her] defence.').
33. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
34. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under
State Constitutions when the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What
Rights Are Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 61
(2008) (referring to Powell as the "infamous Scottsboro Boys Case").
35. Powell, 287 U.S. at 49-50.
36. Id. at 49, 56.
37. Id. at 57.
38. Id. at 56-57.
39. Id. at 71.
40. Id. at 71, 73.
[Vol. 27:365
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and imperative that the failure of the trial court to make an
effective appointment of counsel was... a denial of due process
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment."4
1
Powell started the Court down the path toward recognizing a
guaranteed right to counsel for indigent defendants, but fell short
in a number of ways. The right was limited to capital cases, 42 and
its emphasis on the extreme facts of the case gave lower courts an
excuse to treat the case as an aberration rather than as
establishing a guaranteed right. 43
The right to counsel progressed further under Johnson v.
Zerbst.44 Johnson had been convicted on federal counterfeiting
charges 45 and the trial court denied his subsequent petition for
habeas corpus, 46 holding that there are some cases in which denial
of counsel under the Sixth Amendment is not sufficient "to make
the trial void and justify its annulment in a habeas corpus
proceeding. ... 47 The Supreme Court reversed, 48 holding that
not only did the Sixth Amendment keep defendants from being
tried unless they have procured their own counsel or waived the
right to do so, 49 it also placed an affirmative duty on the court to
provide counsel for indigent defendants in federal courts who could
not afford their own attorneys. 50
Betts v. Brady decisively expressed the Court's position that
States were not required to provide counsel for indigent
41. Id. at 71.
42. Id. at 73.
43. See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 17, at 1469; see also Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455, 462 (1942) (distinguishing the Powell decision in asserting that "denial by
a State of rights or privileges specifically embodied in [the Sixth Amendment] ...
may, in certain circumstances, or in connection with other elements, operate, in a
given case, to deprive a litigant of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
[Amendment]"); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). The Court noted
that the Powell decision:
did not turn upon the fact that the benefit of counsel would have been
guaranteed to the defendants by the provisions of the Sixth
Amendment .... The decision turned upon the fact that in the particular
situation laid before us in the evidence the benefit of counsel was essential
to the substance of a hearing:
Palko, 302 U.S. at 327.
44. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
45. Id. at 459-60.
46. Id. at 458.
47. Id. at 459 (quoting Bridwell v. Aderhold, 13 F. Supp. 253, 256 (N.D. Ga.
1935)).
48. Id. at 469.
49. Id. at 463; cf. infra note 52 and accompanying text (reiterating the Supreme
Court's interpretation that the Constitution prohibits courts from denying
defendants the right to employ counsel for their defense).
50. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938).
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defendants facing state charges. 51 The Betts Court held that:
[t]he constitutional provisions to the effect that a defendant
should be 'allowed' counsel or should have a right 'to be heard
by himself [or herself] and his [or her] counsel,' or that he [or
she] might be heard by 'either or both,' at his [or her] election,
were intended to do away with the rules which denied
representation, in whole or in part, by counsel in criminal
prosecutions, but were not aimed to compel the [S]tate to
provide counsel for a defendant.52
The Court determined that the right to counsel at trial was
not among the "common and fundamental ideas of fairness and
right,"53 so that, though individual trials conducted without
counsel might lead to convictions that are not individually fair, 54 it
is improper to say that all trials in which defendants are not
represented are unfair to the point of requiring States to appoint
counsel. 55
Following on the heels of these recognitions and denials came
Gideon v. Wainwright.56 The case represented a bulwark of the
Warren Court's rights revolution and has come to hold a revered
place among the Court's landmark cases.57
A. A Fundamental Right Recognized: Gideon v.
Wainwright Requires Indigent Defense
Clarence Earl Gideon's story is one of the most fabled in
Supreme Court lore. In 1962 Gideon sent a handwritten petition
to the Court, appealing in forma pauperis58 his conviction for
breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor.5 9
During his trial, Gideon asked the court to appoint counsel for
him, 60 but the judge denied the request under a Florida law that
required a court to appoint counsel only in capital cases. 61 Gideon
conducted his own defense, including calling and cross-examining
witnesses and presenting an opening statement and closing
argument. 62 At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Gideon
51. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1942).
52. Id. at 466.
53. Id. at 473.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
57. See ANTHoNY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 208-09 (1964) (discussing
Gideon's role in the Court's move toward elevating individual liberty).
58. Id. at 3-4.
59. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 336.





guilty;63 he was sentenced to five years in prison.64
Gideon appealed his conviction to the Florida Supreme Court,
asserting that the trial court's failure to appoint counsel "denied
him rights 'guaranteed by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights
by the United States Government."' 65  Without writing an
accompanying opinion, the court denied Gideon's habeas
petition. 66 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
and, in an ironic move, appointed counsel to represent Gideon on
his in forma pauperis petition. 67
In Gideon, the Court acknowledged its holding in Betts and
directly stated that, if Betts continued as good law, Gideon's claim
would fail. 68 The Court, however, found that Betts had been a
break with previous cases, like Powell, and was out of sync with
"constitutional principles established to achieve a fair system of
justice."69  The Court recognized the general direction of its
jurisprudence leading up to Betts, 70 as well as amicus briefs filed
by twenty-two states calling Betts "an anachronism," 71 in explicitly
overruling it as precedent. 72
The Gideon Court particularly emphasized the inconsistency
of a government that devotes a great amount of its resources to
prosecute crimes, on the one hand, and a defendant who may be
"haled into court ... too poor to hire a lawyer, [and thus] cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him [or her]" 73 on
the other. In a country that emphasizes "procedural and
substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before
impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before
the law,"74 the Court found that a state's failure to appoint counsel
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. Gideon argued specifically that he was denied his Fourth, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at n. 1 (quoting Gideon's remarks at trial).
66. Id. at 337.
67. Id. at 338. The attorney appointed for Gideon was Abe Fortas, due to join
the Supreme Court himself during Lyndon Johnson's presidency. See LEWIS, supra
note 57, at 48-49; Paul Finkelman, Gideon v. Wainwright, MICROSOFT ENCARTA,
available at
http://ca.encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia-761595570/gideon-v_ wainwright.html.
68. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339. Notably, Justice Black, who wrote the Court's
opinion in Gideon, had written the dissenting opinion in Betts when it was handed
down. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474-77 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting).
69. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343-44.
70. Id. at 342.
71. Id. at 345.
72. Id. at 342.




for a defendant undermines those guarantees. 75  "This noble
ideal," said the Court, "cannot be realized if the poor man [or
woman] charged with crime has to face his accusers without a
lawyer to assist him [or her]. '"76
B. A Low Bar: Strickland v. Washington Defines
Representation
While Gideon established that indigent defendants had a
constitutional right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, 77 the
practical implications of the holding were unclear. Left
unaddressed were questions of what constituted counsel and to
what standards counsel would be held in determining whether the
right had been constructively, as well as literally, satisfied.
It took over twenty years for the Supreme Court to provide
guidance on the standards for counsel appointed to represent
indigent defendants. 78 In Strickland v. Washington, the Court
reviewed the case of a defendant who had been charged with
kidnapping and murder in connection with three separate
incidents occurring within ten days of each other, 79 and who was
subsequently sentenced to death.80 Washington's court-appointed
attorney apparently experienced "hopelessness" about the case
after Washington acted contrary to his advice, and curtailed his
efforts to advocate for his client.8 ' Washington sought collateral
relief for ineffective assistance of counsel. 82
The Florida Supreme Court upheld Washington's convictions
and sentences because he had "failed to make out a prima facie
case of either 'substantial deficiency or possible prejudice,"' 8 3
which would afford him relief for ineffective assistance of counsel
under the Florida standard. Washington sought federal habeas
relief.8 4 The district court denied Washington's petition,8 5 and the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently held that in order to
show ineffectiveness a defendant must demonstrate that "counsel's
errors 'resulted in actual and substantial disadvantage to the
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 342.
78. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
79. Id. at 671.
80. Id. at 675.
81. Id. at 672.
82. Id. at 675.
83. Id. at 678 (quoting Washington v. State, 397 So.2d 285, 287 (Fla. 1981)).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 679.
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course of his defense.' '8 6 The court remanded the case8 7 for a fact-
specific inquiry of whether Washington could show disadvantage.8 8
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari8 9 and
held that the justification for requiring States to appoint counsel
for defendants is to ensure a fair trial, 90 which requires more than
44a person who happens to be a lawyer ... present at trial alongside
the accused.. ,,91 Effectiveness is judged, said the Court, by
evaluating "whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be
relied on as having produced a just result."92
In order to determine whether counsel meets this bar of
effectiveness, the Court established a two-pronged test.93 First,
counsel's performance must be deficient, and second, the
defendant must show that that deficient performance prejudiced
the defense so as to deprive him or her of a fair trial. 94 In order to
show prejudice, a defendant must "show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome." 95 The Court found that, due to the idiosyncrasies of
each case, "[m]ore specific guidelines are not appropriate." 96 And,
perhaps most notably, the Court endorsed a "strong presumption
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance." 97
Under these standards, the Court found that Washington's
attorney acted reasonably and Washington did not suffer prejudice
from the attorney's actions. 98 Reaching even more broadly, it also
held that the standards that lower courts across the nation had
used were almost all sufficiently similar to the newly-articulated
ineffectiveness standard that they would not need to reconsider
previously rejected ineffectiveness claims. 99 In moving forward,
86. Id. at 682 (quoting Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1262 (1982)).
87. Id. at 682-83.
88. Id. at 680-81.
89. Strickland v. Washington, 462 U.S. 1105 (1983).
90. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984).
91. Id. at 685.
92. Id. at 686.
93. Id. at 687.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 694.
96. Id. at 688.
97. Id. at 689.
98. Id. at 698-99.
99. Id. at 696-97.
20091
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however, courts now had a delineated standard by which to judge
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
II. A Broader View of Right to Counsel: The Need
for Resources
Prior to 1985, the Supreme Court's rulings on access to
expert evidence to present a defense were notably thin. The Court
had addressed the issue only once, and then rather cursorily, in
U.S. ex rel. Smith v. Baldi.100 In Baldi, the Court held that a state
trial judge's refusal to appoint a psychiatrist for a pretrial
examination was acceptable because such an appointment was not
a State's "duty by constitutional mandate."10 1  In rather blunt
language, the Court found that because psychiatrists had
presented at trial, "the issue of petitioner's sanity was heard by
the trial court. Psychiatrists testified. That suffices." 102
The Court clarified the issue of defense access to expert
assistance in its benchmark decision of Ake v. Oklahoma. 10 3 Glenn
Burton Ake was charged with murdering a couple and wounding
their children 10 4 after breaking into their home.105 His behavior in
jail prior to and during arraignment led the trial judge, sua sponte,
to order a psychiatric evaluation to determine "whether the
Defendant may need an extended period of mental observation." 106
The examining psychiatrist reported back to the court that Ake
was probably a paranoid schizophrenic10 7 and Ake was committed
to the state hospital to be evaluated for competency to stand
trial. 108
Upon his commitment, the court held a competency hearing
and determined that Ake was mentally ill, required care and
treatment, and was incompetent to stand trial. 0 9 Six weeks later
the chief forensic psychiatrist informed the court that Ake was
competent to stand trial due to receiving medication. 110 The State
resumed prosecution, and Ake's attorney informed the court that
100. U.S. ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
101. Id. at 568.
102. Id.
103. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
104. Id. at 70.
105. Id. at 88 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).




110. Id. at 71, 86.
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Ake would be relying on an insanity defense.111 The attorney
requested that the court provide funds for a psychiatrist to
examine Ake with regard to his mental condition at the time of the
alleged offenses. 112 The trial judge refused Ake's request, relying
on Baldi.113  Ake proceeded to trial and used an insanity
defense, 114 but was found guilty on all counts 1 15 when the jury was
instructed that Ake must be presumed sane at the time of the
offenses "unless he presented evidence sufficient to raise a
reasonable doubt about his sanity at that time." 116 The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals confirmed both Ake's conviction and
resulting death sentence, 1 1 7 holding that "the State does not have
the responsibility of providing [court-appointed psychiatric
experts] to indigents charged with capital crimes."118
The Supreme Court granted certiorari' 19 and reversed. 120
The Court held that a defendant's access to a psychiatrist is part of
a State's obligation to "assure that the defendant has a fair
opportunity to present his [or her] defense" under the
"fundamental fairness" guarantee in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 21  Under the Constitution, said the
Court, an indigent defendant is entitled to a court-appointed
psychiatric expert when he or she "has made a preliminary
showing that his [or her] sanity at the time of the offense is likely
to be a significant factor at trial."' 22 It set out three factors to
consider in determining when the State must provide a psychiatric
expert: first, the private interest affected by the state action;
second, the governmental interest affected if the defendant is
granted an expert; and third, the probable value of the procedural
safeguards sought balanced with the risk of erroneously depriving
the defendant of his or her interests absent those safeguards.
123
In applying these factors, the Court determined that Ake had
made a threshold showing that his sanity at the time of the
offenses was likely to be a significant factor in his defense, so as to




115. Id. at 73.
116. Id. (emphasis in original).
117. Id. at 74.
118. Ake v. State, 663 P.2d 1, 6 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
119. Ake v. Oklahoma, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984).
120. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74 (1985).
121. Id. at 76.
122. Id. at 74.
123. Id. at 77.
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entitle him to a court-appointed psychiatric expert. 124 The Court
remanded the case. 125
The Supreme Court's decision in Ake was notably limited. It
narrowly restricted its holding to the issue of whether an indigent
defendant had a right to psychiatric assistance, and did not
address access to experts generally.126 Further, although the
Court's opinion did not qualify the cases in which defendants were
entitled to assistance, Chief Justice Burger's concurrence asserted
that its applicability was specifically limited to capital cases. 127
Ake established that the Constitution guaranteed indigent
defendants' at least some right to expert assistance in preparing
their defenses, but left the reach of this right largely undefined.
III. What Wasn't Said: The Failures Inherent in
Gideon and Strickland
The sleeping lawyer. 1 28  The drunk lawyer. 129  The lawyer
under the influence of drugs. 130 These horror stories make the
rounds like urban legends, shocking us with their seeming
disregard for criminal defendants' rights. Unfortunately, these
stories are true. Under Gideon's guarantee of a right to counsel
and Strickland's standards for demonstrating ineffective
124. Id. at 86.
125. Id. at 87.
126. Id. at 70.
127. Id. at 87 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
128. See McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 505 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 1119 (1997) (acknowledging evidence that one of the appellant's
attorneys had slept through portions of his trial, but finding that under the
"totality of circumstances, appellant fails to make any showing that he was not
effectively represented").
129. See Haney v. State, 603 So.2d 368, 378 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991), affid sub
nom. Ex parte Haney, 603 So.2d 412 (Ala. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Haney v.
Alabama, 507 U.S. 925 (1993) (recognizing that one of appellant's attorneys had
been held in contempt of court and incarcerated for appearing at trial under the
influence of alcohol, but finding that there was "no merit" to the claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel because there was "no evidence that the incarceration of
counsel interfered, in any manner, with the conduct of the defense").
130. See Young v. Zant, 727 F.2d 1489, 1493 (11th Cir. 1984), dismissed on
subsequent appeal sub nom. Young v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 514 (11th Cir. 1985)
(acknowledging that petitioner's trial attorney had been convicted for drug
possession shortly after petitioner's trial and admitted drug use, but holding that
the trial record "fail[ed] to support any claim that [the attorney's] handling of the
trial was affected by his drug usage"); see also Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the
Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103
Yale L.J. 1835, 1859 (detailing a situation in which a defendant who had been
sentenced to death met his attorney in a prison yard weeks after being sentenced,
that the attorney then plead guilty to state and federal drug charges, and that the
defendant was eventually executed).
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assistance of counsel, each of these impaired attorneys has been
found legally effective, and their clients' sentences have been
upheld. 131
Such patently deficient attorney performance has been
condoned as a direct result of what the Court did not say in Gideon
and Strickland, and what it has continually refused to address.
These shortcomings are twofold. First, the decisions are deficient
in that they fail to adequately ground their legal standards
constitutionally. Strickland's two-prong test requires a defendant
to show that counsel's deficiencies prejudiced his or her defense in
order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.1 32  This
requirement fails to contemplate whether a trial in which counsel
was ineffective can ever not be prejudiced, 133 and thus whether
such a trial can satisfy the constitutional requirements of
assistance of counsel and due process.134 Second, the Gideon and
Strickland decisions fail on a practical level: they provide no
guidance for states on the minimum standards and funding that
the Court would find appropriate to achieve the ends that the
decisions mandate. 1 35
A. Legal Standards
The United States' adversarial system of criminal justice
asserts that "one cannot know the 'correct' result without first
131. See Young, 727 F.2d at 1493 (affirming petitioner's conviction); Haney, 603
So.2d at 412 (finding no merit to appellant's application for rehearing and denying
the application); McFarland, 928 S.W.2d at 524 (finding no reversible error and
affirming the trial court's conviction).
132. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1985).
133. Id. at 711-12 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ('The majority contends that the
Sixth Amendment is not violated when a manifestly guilty defendant is convicted
after a trial in which he [or she] was represented by a manifestly ineffective
attorney."); see also Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 279 (1967) (Black, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Black stated:
I think it far safer for constitutional rights for this Court to adhere to
constitutional language like "the accused shall ... have the Assistance of
Counsel for his [or her] defence" instead of substituting the words not
mentioned, "the accused shall have the assistance of counsel only if the
Supreme Court thinks it necessary to assure a fair trial."
388 U.S. at 279 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
134. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV.
135. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (establishing that "[o]ur
concern is that the indigent defendant have access to a competent psychiatrist ...
and as in the case of the provision of counsel we leave to the State the decision of
how to implement this right") (emphasis added); THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATE
INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSIONS 1 (2006), http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/
sclaid/defender/downloads/state-indigentdefensefeb07.pdf (discussing the Court's
silence on funding indigent defense and states' responses).
2009]
Law and Inequality
allowing the process to operate properly."'136 But the Strickland
"prejudice" prong undermines this fundamental systemic tenet,
even while professing to embrace it. 137 The Strickland Court cited
an attorney's role under the Sixth Amendment as "critical to the
ability of the adversarial system to produce just results."'138 The
Court's test for assessing effectiveness, however, does not
recognize the corollary that results reached in a trial with
ineffective counsel cannot produce just results. Instead, the
Court's "prejudice" prong assumes that there are some instances in
which a defendant's substandard counsel will deliver a fair
result. 139 In fact, the Court seems to assume that this is the norm,
and sets an unreasonably high bar for proving errors that would
satisfy the "deficiency" prong of the effectiveness test, in declaring
that there is a "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance . .. ."140
The presumption of effective assistance is doubly flawed in
that it directly contradicts the Supreme Court's holdings that the
party benefitting from the error must show that it was harmless in
order to sustain a conviction-4 1 -i.e. the State must show harmless
error when a defendant appeals a criminal conviction. Strickland
places the burden on the defendant to satisfy both prongs of test
for ineffective assistance of counsel. 142 This requirement, applied
to the Strickland "prejudice" prong, ensures that "[a] defendant
will be found to have had ineffective assistance only if [his or] her
trial appears to have been unfair,"'143 and he or she has satisfied
the burden of showing that it was.
The Court's requirement that reviewing courts assess
136. Richard L. Gabriel, The Strickland Standard for Claims of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel: Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise of Due
Process, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1259, 1266 (1986).
137. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1985) ("The benchmark
for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot
be relied on as having produced a just result.").
138. Id. at 685.
139. Id- at 691 ("An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does
not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no
effect on the judgment.").
140. Id. at 689.
141. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) ("Certainly error,
constitutional error, in illegally admitting highly prejudicial evidence or comments,
casts on someone other than the person prejudiced by it a burden to show that it
was harmless.").
142. See 466 U.S. at 687.
143. Margaret H. Lemos, Civil Challenges to the Use of Low.Bid Contracts for
Indigent Defense, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1808, 1817 (2000) (emphasis in original).
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prejudice in determining whether counsel was effective places an
extreme burden on indigent defendants. 144 It forces them to fight
an uphill battle against a presumption that counsel was effective,
saddled with the burden of showing that they have been
prejudiced by deficient counsel. 145 In addition, if in this context a
State does not guarantee defendants appeals as a matter of right,
they are not entitled to counsel to even help them flesh out their
ineffectiveness claims. 146 In setting the criteria for ineffective
assistance of counsel, the Court pays lip service to the fair trial
envisioned and guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, 147 but
promulgates standards which ignore the Constitution's promise
that only through fair processes can we reach fair results. 148
B. Systemic Standards
The second major shortcoming of Gideon and Strickland is
their silence on the systemic requirements for providing indigent
defense counsel. In these landmark decisions, the Court fails to
provide any guidance to the States in implementing indigent
defense systems that will meet constitutional standards for
effective counsel under the Court's opinions.149 In fact, the Court
implies that States may not have to change their indigent defense
delivery in any way to ensure that attorneys meet the standards it
articulates for effective assistance of counsel. 150 The
constitutional purpose and standard for effective assistance, says
the Court, "is not to improve the quality of legal
144. See Gabriel, supra note 136, at 1277-78 (discussing the burdens that
defendants face in making ineffective assistance of counsel claims under
Strickland).
145. Id.
146. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963).
There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment
where the rich man [or woman], who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit
of counsel's examination into the record, research of the law, and
marshalling of arguments on his [or her] behalf, while the indigent,
already burdened by a preliminary determination that his [or her] case is
without merit, is forced to shift for himself [or herself].
Id. One scholar has argued that "[elven if the state provides a lawyer to raise a
claim of ineffectiveness, there is no guarantee that the new lawyer will be any more
competent than trial counsel." Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The
Rationing and Denial of Legal Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty are at
Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 796 (1997).
147. See 466 U.S. at 691-92.
148. See id. at 711 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe constitutional guarantee of
effective assistance of counsel ... functions to ensure that convictions are obtained
only through fundamentally fair procedures.").
149. See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra note 135, at 1 (discussing the Court's
silence on funding indigent defense and states' responses).
150. See 466 U.S. at 689.
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representation."1 5' The result has been a hodgepodge of state-by-
state approaches, with public defense services constantly in
crisis. 152
Nowhere in Gideon's language does the Court specify how
States are to pay for providing counsel to indigent defendants.153
As a result, States have established widely divergent systems of
funding defense services. 154 Twenty-eight States administer and
fund indigent defense wholly at the state level. 155 The remaining
twenty-two States rely either entirely on local funds1 56 or on a
combination of state and local funding. 157 Some States administer
their indigent defense through coordinated public defender offices,
some through assigning counsel who accept indigent clients, and
some through contracting with private attorneys. 15 8
Despite the differences in funding and delivery, state systems
for providing indigent defense have one common thread:
overwhelming lack of resources. 159 In 2008, the Missouri state
public defender's office handled 12,000 more cases than in 2000-
with the same number of attorneys. 160 Since 2006 the Eleventh
151. Id.
152. See NATIONAL LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, GIDEON REVIEWED: THE
STATE OF THE NATION 40 YEARS LATER,
http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_Gideon/GideonReviewed (last visited
Oct. 4, 2008) [hereinafter GIDEON REVIEWED] (detailing the funding structures for
state indigent defense systems and the shortcomings that these systems have
encountered).
153. See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 17, at 1480.
154. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra note 135, at 1.
155. Id. These states are Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. at i, n.2. Some of these states do receive negligible
local assistance, like office space. Id.
156. Id. at 5. Pennsylvania and Utah provide no state funding for indigent
defense services. Id.
157. Id. Alabama, Kansas, and Oklahoma fund indigent defense through both
state and local funds, but over half their support comes from state monies. Id.
Arizona, California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Texas, and Washington provide at least half of funding through local sources like
property taxes and court costs. Id.; GIDEON REVIEWED, supra note 152.
158. See CAROL J. DEFRANCES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE-FUNDED INDIGENT
DEFENSE SERVICES, 1999, at 1 (2001),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.govfbjs/pub/pdf/sfids99.pdf.
159. See GIDEON REVIEWED, supra note 152 (detailing the challenges and
shortfalls various states have faced in their indigent defense services).
160. Heather Ratcliffe, Backlogs Frustrate St. Louis Courts, ST. LOUIS POST-




Judicial District of Florida has lost 12.6 percent of its budget,
though its caseload has increased twenty-nine percent in the past
four years. 161 Oregon faced a 10.1 million dollar shortfall in its
Indigent Defense Account in 2001-2003162 and put defense of low-
level crimes on hold.163 In 2003, public defenders in Minnesota
prepared for a seven million dollar budget cut 164 by asking the
state supreme court to allow delays in certain criminal proceedings
and limit representation in others.1 65 Four years later, in 2007,
the office faced another shortfall of 3.8 million dollars and lost
sixteen percent of its attorneys. 166  In 2008, the Kentucky
Department of Public Advocacy faced a shortfall of 2.3 million
dollars and planned to stop taking cases involving multiple
defendants charged with the same crime and family court cases. 167
These examples of public defenders being shortchanged are only
some of the most recent links in a chain of denial that stretches
back for years. 168
Under the Supreme Court's Gideon and Strickland holdings,
States have no clear obligation to provide a specific level of
funding for indigent defense. In Gideon, the Court's discussion of
money was limited to acknowledging that the government spends
"vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants
accused of crime.... That government hires lawyers to prosecute
and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the
strongest indications of the wide-spread belief that lawyers in
criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries."1 69
The Court in Strickland did not address funding at all. 70
161. Erik Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, at Al.
162. OREGON JUDICIAL DEP'T, INDIGENT DEFENSE BUDGET REDUCTION PLAN:
FACT SHEET 1 (2003), http://www.ocdla.org/pdf/factsheetmarchlA.pdf.
163. See Kyung M. Lee, Reinventing Gideon v. Wainwright: Holistic Defenders,
Indigent Defendants, and the Right to Counsel, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 367, 374 (2004).
164. Margaret Zack & Pam Louwagie, Public-Defender Fees Thrown Out, STAR
TRIB., Sept. 4, 2003, at B7.
165. Conrad deFiebre, Public Defenders Seek Lighter Load, STAR TRIB., Aug. 30,
2003, at B2.
166. Joy Powell, Parental-Rights Cases: Who Should Pay?, STAR TRIB., Sept. 1,
2008, at B1.
167. Scott Michels, Facing Budget "Crisis," Public Defenders May Refuse Cases,
ABC NEWS, June 13, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=5049461.
168. See Klein, supra note 17, at 656-62 (citing studies and examples of
inadequate public defense funding dating back to 1973).
169. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
170. Cf. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) ('The government is
not responsible for, and hence not able to prevent, attorney errors that will result
in reversal of a conviction or sentence."). Due to the Court's assertion that the
government does not have responsibility for individual attorney error, by corollary
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These decisions fail to even imply that there is any floor on state
funding which would render a state's indigent defense budget
inadequate to provide for a defendant's right to counsel.1 71
Consequently, the Court's silence allows the States to give
indigent defense budgets short-shrift with the Supreme Court's
imprimatur.
Indigent defense providers feel the pain of insufficient
funding on numerous fronts. The American Bar Association (ABA)
and National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA) have
both published standards for defense attorneys that lay out
specific guidelines to ensure quality defense. 172 These guidelines
address such issues as caseloads, 173 training,174 and indigent
defender independence from judicial oversight. 175 By and large
States have ignored or failed to fund these norms in crafting their
indigent defense systems. 176 The Court in Strickland stated that
the Court condones state systems that do not seek to minimize error through
providing their indigent defense attorneys with adequate resources. See id.
171. Further, the Court has never issued any opinion that addresses which
individuals qualify as indigent. Absent guidance in this area, it is possible for
states to define indigence so narrowly that few defendants would qualify for
appointed counsel and States would be obliged to spend little money in their
defense. See Adam M. Gershowitz, The Invisible Pillar of Gideon, 80 IND. L.J. 571,
573 (2005).
172. AM. BAR ASS'N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROVIDING
DEFENSE SERVICES (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]; AM. BAR ASS'N,
ABA TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM (2002),
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/tenprinciples
booklet.pdf;
National Legal Aid & Defender Association, Guidelines for Legal Defense Systems
in the United States, available at http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_
Standards/Guidelines ForLegal_DefenseSystems [hereinafter NLADA,
Guidelines].
173. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 172, at 72 (addressing workload in Standard 5-
5.3); NLADA, Guidelines, supra note 172 (addressing minimum pending workload
levels for individual attorneys in Standard 5.1, and elimination of excessive
caseloads in Standard 5.3).
174. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 172, at 25 (addressing training and
professional development in Standard 5-1.5); NLADA, Guidelines, supra note 172
(addressing training staff attorneys in a defender system in Standard 5.7, and
training assigned counsel in Standard 5.8).
175. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 172, at 13 (addressing professional
independence in Standard 5-1.3); NIADA, Guidelines, supra note 172 (addressing
the governing body for assigned counsel programs in Standard 2.13).
176. SCOTT WALLACE & DAVID CARROLL, IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT OF
INDIGENT DEFENSE STANDARDS, DECEMBER 2003, at 21-22 (2004)
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/205023.pdf (surveying seventy-four
indigent defense providers in all fifty states and finding, inter alia, that in areas
tracking the ABA standards, only forty percent of providers had numerical
standards for workload, fewer than thirty percent had standards for parity of
resources with prosecutors, and only sixty-six percent had standards for attorney
qualifications). In addition, the survey found that many of these standards are
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"[p]revailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar
Association standards and the like are guides to determining what
is reasonable," but cautioned that they were "only guides." 177
Overall, the Court held that the "proper measure of attorney
performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms." 178
The Court's nod to ABA standards is rendered toothless when
it indicates that they are only guides. Strickland fails to create a
binding floor on the standards to which States must hold the
attorneys that they appoint for indigent defendants. 179 The failure
to set concrete minimums 180 results in attorney work standards,
and funding requirements, being given short shrift.
Nowhere is the need for enforceable standards more evident
than in the area of caseloads. The ABA recommends that
attorneys handle no more than 150 felonies or 400 misdemeanors
per year.' 8 ' In Florida, Miami-Dade County public defenders
handle an average of 500 felony cases or 2,225 misdemeanor cases
per year, up from 367 and 1,380, respectively, in 2005.182 The
King County (Washington) Council is considering budget cuts that
could force two attorneys to handle 2,900 cases per year.18 3 Such
daunting numbers, in the words of one chief public defender, often
lead to "part-time lawyers working full time, full-time lawyers
working nights and weekends to get the job done .... It's not
sustainable." 8 4
State shortcomings in funding indigent defense counsel and
holding them to clear standards have measurable impacts on the
defendants these attorneys represent. As of 2001, defendants
represented by court-appointed attorneys in the 100 most
populous counties in the country were incarcerated seventeen
percent more often than those represented by private attorneys.18 5
voluntary. Id.




181. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 172, at 72 (discussing workload in Standard 5-
5.3).
182. Eckholm, supra note 161.
183. Levi Pulkkinen, Public Defense Lawyers Protest Cuts, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 31, 2008, available at
http://www.seattlepi.com/local/385775_defenders3l.html.
184. deFiebre, supra note 165.
185. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Indigent Defense Statistics: Summary Findings,




These defendants also faced longer prison sentences than their
privately-represented counterparts. 186 Among the jurisdictions
that do have standards paralleling the ABA recommendations, few
have had inquiries from other state or local indigent defense
providers seeking to implement the ABA standards themselves, 8 7
despite overwhelming reporting that they have a positive impact
on representation. 8 8
Without the Supreme Court's clear statement that States
have an obligation to meet minimum standards in their public
defense systems, all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are
judged on a case-by-case basis under the legally insufficient
Strickland standard. 8 9 This method all but assures widespread
and continued ineffectiveness, and a deluge of individual cases to
adjudicate whether counsel's performance was effective. As a
result of the Court's failure to address systemic standards, States
are able to perpetuate indigent defense systems that should render
their attorneys ineffective by default. Attorneys in these systems
are unable to adequately represent their clients with "such skill
and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial
testing process,"'190 as the Court requires, because the Court does
not correspondingly require that they be given the tools with
which to do so.
IV. Ake's Unanswered Questions
Similar to its Gideon and Strickland decisions, the Supreme
Court's opinion in Ake is problematic due to the issues that it
neglected to address. While the Court spoke broadly of providing
the 'basic tools of an adequate defense'... to those defendants
who cannot afford to pay for them,"'191 and narrowly of "the pivotal
role that psychiatry has come to play in criminal proceedings,"' 92
it ignored much in the breach. Paralleling Gideon and Strickland,
the Court's omissions in Ake can be classified as both
constitutionally and systemically insufficient in providing
guidance for lower courts regarding access to expert witnesses.
186. Id.
187. WALLACE & CARROLL, supra note 176, at 25.
188. See id. at 26.
189. See supra Part III.A.
190. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
191. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (citation omitted).
192. Id. at 79.
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A. Legal Standards
Ake represents the Supreme Court's attempt to narrowly
tailor a decision to the facts of the case at bar, while ignoring its
broader implications. The Court specifically stated that its
holding in Ake determined whether "the Constitution requires that
an indigent defendant have access to the psychiatric examination
and assistance necessary to prepare an effective defense," 193 thus
declining to explicitly extend its reasoning beyond psychiatrists
into the realm of other experts. 194  Chief Justice Burger, in
concurrence, specified that "[n]othing in the Court's opinion
reaches noncapital cases," 195 without contradiction from the
majority.196 These limitations have left lower courts to decide,
without direction, whether Ake's three-factor test for providing a
psychiatric expert 197 to a capital defendant 198 requires a broader
application.199 Most courts have concluded that Ake does apply to
non-capital defendants 200 and experts apart from psychiatrists. 201
193. Id. at 70.
194. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n.1 (1985) (exemplifying the
Supreme Court's continued refusal to rule on whether indigent defendants are
entitled to non-psychiatric expert assistance).
195. Ake, 470 U.S. at 87 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
196. It is interesting to note, however, that in discussing whether expanded
access to expert assistance would be a financial burden to states, the Court
identifies states that have already granted defendants such assistance and
specifically notes those that have extended this access to non-capital defendants.
Id. at 78 n.4.
197. Id. at 77; see supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text.
198. Ake, 470 U.S. at 73, 83.
199. See, e.g., Gary v. Schofield, 336 F. Supp.2d 1337, 1355 (Ga. 2004). The
holding in Ake is limited to psychiatric assistance. However, the Eleventh
Circuit has assumed, but never specifically held, that the "due process
clause could require the government to provide non-psychiatric expert
assistance to an indigent defendant upon a sufficient showing of need."
This Court therefore finds Ake applicable to non-psychiatric experts.
Id. (citations omitted).
200. See, e.g., Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1243 (8th Cir. 1987) (en
banc), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (holding that the defendant was entitled to state-
funded hypnosis expert in a non-capital burglary and rape trial in determining that
"the rule of Ake should be applied . . . where . . . the death penalty is not a
possibility"); see also Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert
Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 1369
(2004) [hereinafter Giannelli, Right to Expert Assistance] (noting that "most courts
assume that Ake applies to noncapital cases"). But see United States v. Osoba, 213
F.3d 913, 917 (6th Cir. 2000) (affirming the defendant's conviction for distribution
of heroin and finding that the trial court's denial of his motion for the assistance of
a psychiatric expert was appropriate since "[d]ue process does not mandate that
[the defendant] be given psychological assistance ... because ... [inter alia] he has
not been convicted of a capital offense").
201. See, e.g., Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 227 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that
the defendant did not meet the threshold showing that evidence be both critical to
the conviction and subject to varying expert opinion, but finding that when
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Lower courts, however, struggle both to apply the Supreme Court's
three factors in order to determine which resources constitute
"basic tools" of a defense, and to set the threshold that a defendant
must meet in order to show that an issue will be a "significant
factor" at trial. 202
The Court's Ake decision fails mainly in neglecting to define
"basic tools" 20 3 or "significant factors." 20 4 Without instruction in
how to determine whether a defendant's expert requests fall into
these categories, the task has fallen to lower courts. 20 5 These
courts have generally looked to the third balancing factor of Ake 20 6
for guidance in formulating their tests for the right to expert
defendants do meet this standard, "non-psychiatric experts, such as ballistic
experts, should be provided"); Armontrout, 835 F.2d at 1243 (holding that the
defendant was entitled to a state-funded hypnosis expert in a non-capital burglary
and rape trial because there is "no principled way to distinguish between
psychiatric and nonpsychiatric experts. The question in each case must be not
what field of science or expert knowledge is involved, but rather how important the
scientific issue is in the case, and how much help a defense expert could have
given"); see also Giannelli, Right to Expert Assistance, supra note 200, at 1365-68
(discussing that, while courts disagree, "[r]estricting Ake to psychiatry would have
made it a case of negligible significance"). Contra State v. Evans, 710 S.W.2d 530
(Ten. Crim. App. 1985) (upholding the denial of a ballistics expert to the defendant
by distinguishing his case from the defendant in Ake on the basis that it was a
"non-capital prosecution where the defendant made no preliminary showing that
such expertise was needed to aid him in his defense"). The 11th Circuit has held in
such cases that, even ifAke applied to non-psychiatric assistance, based on the facts
of appealing defendants' cases they would not qualify for such aid. Thus, the court
has never specifically declared whether it considers these experts covered under
Ake. See United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1365 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied
549 U.S. 1182 (2007); Conklin v. Schofield, 366 F.3d 1191, 1206-07 (11th Cir.
2004), cert. denied 544 U.S. 952 (2005); Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 711-12 (11th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied 481 U.S. 1054 (1987).
202. Scholars discussing Ake are often unclear as to whether the rules that lower
courts have laid down define "basic tools" or "significant factors." See, e.g., David A.
Harris, The Constitution and Truth Seeking: A New Theory on Expert Services for
Indigent Defendants, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 469, 483 (1992) (noting that
the Court left the terms "significant factor" and "basic tool" for lower courts to
define). "Basic tools" is properly understood as the requested expert him or
herself-the vehicle through which a defendant hopes to make his or her case. See
Ake, 470 U.S. at 77. "Significant factors," on the other hand, refers to the issue on
which the expert will offer assistance. See id. at 83. Thus in Ake, the Court
determined that Ake's sanity at the time of trial was a significant factor in his
defense and he was entitled to the basic tool of a psychiatrist to adequately present
his claim of insanity. Id.
203. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 77.
204. See id. at 74.
205. Harris, supra note 202, at 483.
206. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 ('The third [relevant factor to determining when the
state must provide an indigent defendant with psychiatric assistance] is the
probable value of the addition or substitute procedural safeguards that are sought,




Using the third Ake factor, many federal courts of appeals
and state courts have adopted the two-prong test that the
Eleventh Circuit used in Moore v. Kemp 208 for determining when
an indigent defendant is entitled to expert assistance. 209 Moore
held that:
[A defendant who seeks expert assistance] must demonstrate
something more than a mere possibility of assistance from a
requested expert .... [A] defendant must show the trial court
that there exists a reasonable probability both that an expert
would be of assistance to the defense and that denial of expert
assistance would result in a fundamentally unfair trial.
2 10
These prongs roughly correspond to the Supreme Court's
"significant factors" and "basic tools" requirements from Ake. 211
Demonstrating that an expert would be of assistance goes to
determining whether the defendant needs the "basic tool" of an
expert to prepare a defense. Evaluating whether a court's decision
to deny expert assistance renders a trial fundamentally unfair
reflects on whether the issue that an expert will speak to is
considered a "significant factor" in a case. Each of these
requirements poses a problem for defendants and must be
addressed in turn.
1. Significant Factors
Under Ake, the Supreme Court held that the government has
a responsibility to ensure that trials are fundamentally fair by
affording defendants "access to the raw materials integral to the
207. See Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 741 (11th Cir. 1987) (Johnson, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[I]t is solely upon the third [Ake] factor,
the probable value of the expert assistance and the risk of error attendant upon its
denial, that courts will focus in deciding these questions.").
208. Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702 (11th Cir. 1987).
209. See, e.g., Page v. Lee, 337 F.3d 411, 416 (4th Cir. 2003) (approving the
North Carolina Supreme Court's test for determining whether an expert witness
should be appointed, specifically due to the test's consistency with Moore v. Kemp);
Williams v. Collins, 989 F.2d 841, 845-46 (5th Cir. 1993) (adopting the Moore v.
Kemp standard for appointing expert witnesses); Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d
1240, 1244 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing the Moore v. Kemp test with approval); Ex parte
Moody, 684 So. 2d 114, 119 (Ala. 1996) (using the Moore v. Kemp test); Crawford v.
State, 362 S.E.2d 201, 206 (Ga. 1987) (employing the Moore v. Kemp test); State v.
Touchet, 642 So. 2d 1213, 1216 (La. 1994) (adopting the Moore v. Kemp test); Moore
v. State, 889 A.2d 325, 340 (Md. 2005) (agreeing with and adopting the Moore v.
Kemp test). But cf. State v. Williams, 800 P.2d 1240, 1247 (Ariz. 1987) ("[A]
criminal defendant is entitled to a mental examination by court-appointed
psychiatrists if he [or she] can establish 'that reasonable grounds for an
examination exist."' (quoting ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 11.3)).
210. 809 F.2d at 712 (footnotes omitted).
211. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74, 77 (1985).
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building of an effective defense." 212 The Moore test accounted for
this precedent by requiring that a defendant "show... that denial
of expert assistance would result in a fundamentally unfair
trial."213  The "fundamentally unfair trial" showing is most
problematic for defendants in that they must demonstrate that an
issue for which they request expert assistance will be a significant
factor at trial.214
Much as defendants have difficulty meeting the Strickland
requirement that they show "prejudice" due to ineffective
assistance of counsel in a trial that has taken place, 215 defendants
are disadvantaged in showing "fundamental unfairness" due to
lack of expert witnesses, in a trial that has not yet occurred.
Under both approaches a defendant is required to show that his or
her trial will go or would have gone differently but for inadequate
assistance. 216 Such a standard "demand[s] that the defendant
possess already the expertise of the witness sought." 217  The
defendant must show that an issue will be significant at trial such
that an expert is necessary, but has no expert assistance before
trial to help determine the issue's significance.
The Ake Court's discussion included a hypothetical situation
of a defendant whose defense may be "devastated by the absence of
a psychiatric examination,"' 21S but "with such assistance ... might
have a reasonable chance of success." 219  Some lower courts,
however, have avoided using reasonableness language as the
determining factor in deciding whether denial of an expert renders
a trial fundamentally unfair. 220 This level of specificity is not
212. See id. at 77.
213. Moore, 809 F.2d at 712.
214. See, e.g., id. at 742-43 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("[T]he majority's reading of Ake creates a proverbial 'Catch-22,' making it
impossible for all but the most nimble (and prescient) defendant to obtain expert
assistance under Ake ... ").
215. See supra notes 141-148 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 141-145 and accompanying text.
217. Giannelli, Right to Expert Assistance, supra note 200, at 1375 (quoting
State v. Moore, 364 S.E.2d 648, 657 (N.C. 1988)) (alteration in original); see also
Emily J. Groendyke, Ake v. Oklahoma: Proposals for Making the Right a Reality,
10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POLy' 367, 379 (2007) ("[Ihe factual showing requires
defendants to provide information that they literally do not have."); A. Michelle
Willis, Nonpsychiatric Expert Assistance and the Requisite Showing of Need: A
Catch-22 in the Post-Ake Criminal Justice System, 37 EMORY L.J. 995, 1026 (1988)
("[Tihe defendant must essentially inform the court of precisely the information
that he [or she] cannot know without the expert being requested.").
218. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
219. Id.
220. See, e.g., Terry v. Rees, 985 F.2d 283, 284 (6th Cir. 1993) (failing to use
reasonableness language in holding that "[c]riminal trials are fundamentally unfair
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required under Ake. But lower court interpretation, along with
Supreme Court failure to clarify constitutional requirements, 221
have led to an incredibly difficult threshold showing for defendants
to meet in requesting expert assistance.
The high threshold of showing that any one issue is
significant enough to require expert assistance for the trial to be
fundamentally fair is compounded by the complex nature of most
criminal cases. 222 The Ake Court held that "Ake's mental state at
the time of the offense was a substantial factor in his defense...
[because his] sole defense was that of insanity."223  While Ake's
sanity was clearly significant because it was the all-or-nothing
decider in attempting to present an insanity defense, many
criminal cases hinge on a confluence of interdependent facts and
factors. 224 It may not be the case that any one issue is outcome
determinative in a case, but taken together several issues may
if a state proceeds against an indigent defendant without making certain that he
has access to the raw materials integral to building a defense"); Husske v.
Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925 (Va. 1996).
[Ain indigent defendant who seeks the appointment of an expert witness,
at the Commonwealth's expense, must demonstrate that the subject which
necessitates the assistance of the expert is "likely to be a significant factor
in his defense," and that he will be prejudiced by the lack of expert
assistance. An indigent defendant may satisfy this burden by
demonstrating that the services of an expert would materially assist him
in the preparation of his defense and that the denial of such services would
result in a fundamentally unfair trial. The indigent defendant who seeks
the appointment of an expert must show a particularized need ....
Id. (citations omitted).
221. In the only case that the Supreme Court has taken since Strickland that
addresses the requirement for demonstrating a need for experts, the Court
dismissed a defendant's request for expert assistance in a footnote by holding that
he had "offered little more than undeveloped assertions that the requested
assistance would be beneficial" and therefore finding it had "no need to determine
as a matter of federal constitutional law what if any showing would have entitled a
defendant to assistance .. " Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n.1 (1985).
222. See Harris, supra note 202, at 486-87 (asserting that most issues experts in
criminal cases deal with are not "outcome-determinative" on their own, but are
"links in the evidentiary chain").
223. Ake, 470 U.S. at 86.
224. See Harris, supra note 202, at 512-13 (arguing that indigent defendants
will not receive all the expert assistance that they need under Ake's "basic tools"
theory because in most cases many interdependent facts are at issue, all of which
the prosecution must prove, and few qualify as "basic tools" by being "all-or-
nothing" factors for the defense in and of themselves). Though Harris asserts that
the complexity of criminal cases undermines a defendant's ability to receive the
"basic tools" necessary for a defense, this argument is more appropriately classified
as relating to "significant factors." The argument addresses the threshold showing
that a defendant must make in order to show that the issue is important rather
than the showing required to request an expert to help address the issue. See supra
note 202.
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lead to reasonable doubt.225 Lower courts determining whether
individual issues are significant factors may short-change a case's
material issues by categorically denying assistance whenever it is
not a "resource without which the defense fails."226 A defendant's
burden to show, without expert assistance, that denying an expert
undermines fundamental trial fairness, even when an issue
standing alone may not be outcome determinative, creates
unconscionable barriers for defendants seeking experts to help
them present significant issues at trial.
2. Basic Tools
The Ake Court found that when a defendant "cannot offer a
well-informed expert's opposing view, and thereby loses a
significant opportunity to raise in the jurors' minds questions
about the State's proof," then "due process requires access to a
psychiatric examination on relevant issues, to the testimony of the
psychiatrist, and to assistance in preparation ... ,"227 Moore's test
accounts for this right in its first prong by granting a defendant
expert assistance when he or she can show a reasonable
probability that an expert would assist the defense. 228 Like the
fundamental fairness determination, courts have rooted the right
to an expert as a basic tool of defense in the third of Ake's
balancing factors. 229
A significant point of contention regarding when expert
assistance will assist the defense arises when courts consider
whether a "neutral" expert would satisfy Ake under the Moore
test. 230 Ake's language seems to clearly imply that experts should
be partisan by stating that "psychiatrists for each party enable the
jury to make its most accurate determination of the truth .... 2 3 1
225. See Harris, supra note 202, at 487.
226. Id. at 486.
227. Ake, 470 U.S. at 84.
228. See Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 712 (11th Cir. 1987).
229. See, e.g., Johnson v. Gibson, 169 F.3d 1239, 1246-47 (10th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he
critical factor in assessing whether a particular expert is a required 'basic tool' of
an adequate defense is the third prong of the test that deals with the probable
value and risk of error associated with the additional assistance.").
230. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 87 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (asserting that a
defendant's entitlement to an expert should only extend to "an independent
psychiatric evaluation, not to a defense consultant").
231. .Id. at 81 (emphasis added); see also Tuggle v. Netherland, 516 U.S. 10, 13
(1995) (per curiam) ('The Ake error prevented petitioner from developing his own
psychiatric evidence to rebut the Commonwealth's evidence and to enhance his
defense in mitigation.") (emphasis added); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19
(1967).
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses ... is in plain terms the right
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The Court also implied that the expert accessible to a defendant
has a role in preparing a defense by "help[ing] determine whether
the insanity defense is viable... [and] assist[ing] in preparing the
cross-examination of a State's psychiatric witnesses .... -232
These functions are inimical to a neutral expert. Yet the Court
raised doubt by stating that a defendant does not have a
"constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his [or her]
personal liking or to receive funds to hire his [or her] own." 233
Lower courts have sometimes taken advantage of the Supreme
Court's unclear language and decision not to explicitly state that a
defendant is entitled to an independent expert. 234
In some decisions, courts have held that defendants are
entitled to partisan, non-psychiatric expert assistance only when
opinions could legitimately vary.235 Distinguishing between
scientific opinions that can vary and those which are "reliable" is
problematic because humans are involved in any scientific testing,
as are their attendant errors and subjectivity. 236 In a seminal
study on the reliability of forensic laboratories, "only twenty
percent... produced completely accurate results in simple tests"
on such common criminal evidence as drugs, blood, and
firearms. 237  In 2002, the DNA unit of the Houston Police
to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the
facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the
truth lies.... This right is a fundamental element of due process of law.
388 U.S. at 19.
232. Ake, 470 U.S. at 82.
233. Id. at 83.
234. See, e.g., Dunn v. State, 722 S.W.2d 595, 596 (Ark. 1987) ("[The defendant]
perceives under Ake that he is entitled to the assistance of a psychiatrist who is
unaffiliated with the state or county. We believe he misinterprets Ake."); State v.
Gambrell, 347 S.E.2d 390, 395 (N.C. 1986) ("It is clear ... that the constitution
does not give an indigent defendant the right to choose his own psychiatrist or even
to receive funds to hire a private psychiatric expert .... The appointment of state
employed psychiatrists may fulfill the state's constitutional obligation.").
235. See, e.g., Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 227 (5th Cir. 1993) ("[N]on-
psychiatric experts.., should be provided only if the evidence is both critical to the
conviction and subject to varying expert opinion." (internal quotations omitted));
State v. Evans, 710 S.W.2d 530, 534 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985) (holding that a
defendant was not entitled to an independent ballistics expert because "the record
contains nothing to indicate any unreliability regarding the ballistics tests. The
defendant's contention is therefore based entirely upon speculation as to what an
additional ballistics expert might have found.") (emphasis in original); see also
Willis, supra note 217, at 1018 ("[Clourts have asserted that a defendant does not
need a partisan expert when the results of testing are precise and not subject to
varying interpretations.").
236. See Paul C. Giannelli, Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evidence, and DNA, 44
VAND. L. REV. 791, 795-97, 800 (1991) [hereinafter Giannelli, Criminal Discovery];
Giannelli, Right to Expert Assistance, supra note 200, at 1395-97.
237. Harris, supra note 202, at 513 (citing JOSEPH L. PETERSON ET AL., U.S.
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Department Crime Lab was shut down after a state audit led to
retesting evidence in 360 cases; the results showed at least
eighteen cases in which retests did not confirm the original
results.238 In 2008, the Detroit police shut down their crime lab
after a state audit showed errors in ten percent of cases in the gun
lab. 239
These examples demonstrate the inherent risk in assuming
that any scientific testing is reliable simply because it is scientific.
Human error is possible whenever humans perform tests. The
likelihood of error may also be affected by prosecutorial bias.
Nearly eighty percent of the more than 250 crime laboratories in
the United States are controlled by police or public health
agencies. 240 To the extent that technicians have an incentive to
privilege a particular reading of unclear results, it is not
unreasonable to believe that they might interpret tests in favor of
their controlling agencies. Given these human influences, a
court's ability to distinguish between evidence rooted in scientific
opinion and evidence rooted in scientific fact is questionable.
A "neutral" expert cannot account for the need to advocate
differing interpretations of scientific evidence in our adversarial
criminal justice system. That courts persist in endorsing
"neutrality" represents a misunderstanding of scientific analysis
and a misinterpretation of the Supreme Court's dicta in Ake. The
Court has not made a clear statement that neutral experts are
insufficient to assist "each party [in] enabl[ing] the jury to make its
most accurate determination of the truth .... 241 Because of this
oversight, courts have continued to take the presence of "neutral"
experts into account in considering whether expert assistance will
be helpful under Moore's test.242
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING RESEARCH PROGRAM (1978)).
238. Adam Liptak & Ralph Blumenthal, New Doubt Cast on Testing in Houston
Police Crime Lab, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2004, at A19.
239. George Hunter, Detroit Shuts Down Error-Plagued Crime Lab, DETROIT
NEWS, Sept. 26, 2008, at Al.
240. Joseph L. Peterson et al., The Capabilities, Uses, and Effects of the Nation's
Criminalistics Laboratories, 30 J. FORENSIC SCI. 10, 11 (1985). The article's
statistics are based on mailings to laboratories indentified through the American
Society of Crime Laboratory Directors and the Forensic Science Foundation, with
an eighty-two percent response rate. Id.
241. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985) (emphasis added).
242. See, e.g., supra note 234 (providing examples of courts refusing to provide a
partisan expert, despite the holding in Ake); supra note 235 (providing examples of
courts refusing to provide non-psychiatric expert, despite the holding in Ake).
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B. Systemic Standards
Ake's other major shortcoming mirrors that of Gideon and
Strickland in its failure to address the standards that States
should enforce system-wide in order to provide expert resources for
indigent defendants. The Ake Court expressly equated access to
experts with access to counsel in stating its "concern ... that the
indigent defendant have access to a competent psychiatrist.., and
as in the case of the provision of counsel we leave to the States the
decision on how to implement this right."24 3 By tying these two
services together the Court compounds the problems that it has
caused by explicitly addressing neither. 244
State laws and systems for providing expert assistance to
indigent defendants vary, as do their systems for providing
indigent counsel. Some States explicitly provide for expert
services in their statutes. 245 Some provide for them indirectly by
reference to expenses incurred by counsel. 246 Some state statutes
apply only in capital cases. 247 Many set financial limits on the
243. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83.
244. See supra Part III.B.
245. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 802-7 (1993) (stating that the court may, upon a
showing that a criminal defendant is unable to pay for such fees, direct expenses
for experts to be waived or paid from available court funds); MINN. STAT. §
611.21(a) (2006) (stating that a defendant with income not greater than 125
percent of the poverty line may file an ex parte application requesting expert
services for an adequate defense in the case); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135.055(3)
(West Supp. 2008) (stating that a person determined eligible for appointed counsel
is entitled to necessary and reasonable fees associated with expert witness fees and
expenses); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05(d), (h) (Vernon Supp. 2008)
(stating that counsel appointed to represent defendant shall be reimbursed for
reasonable and necessary expenses, including expenses for investigation and for
mental health and other experts).
246. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §15-12-21(d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008) ("Counsel .. .
shall be entitled to receive for their services a fee to be approved by the trial court.
Counsel shall also be entitled to be reimbursed for any expenses reasonably
incurred in the defense of his or her client to be approved in advance by the trial
court."); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-860(a)(2), (b) (2004) ("[Tlhe appropriate district
court, upon application, shall prescribe a reasonable rate of compensation for his
services and shall determine the direct expenses necessary to representation for
which he should be reimbursed."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-3-80 (Supp. 2008) ("This
fund shall be used to reimburse private appointed counsel, public defenders, and
assistant public defenders for necessary expenses actually incurred in the
representation of persons pursuant to this chapter, provided that the expenses are
approved by the trial judge.").
247. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9(a) (West 2008) ("In the trial of a capital
case ... the indigent defendant, through defendant's counsel, may request the
court for funds for the specific payment of investigators, experts, and others for the
preparation or presentation of the defense."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-207(b)
(Supp. 2006).
In capital cases where the defendant has been found to be indgent by the
court of record having jurisdiction of the case, the court in an ex parte
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amount which a defendant may receive to pay an expert. 248 These
varying provisions mean that a defendant may receive vastly
different treatment in different states. In Illinois, expert witness
reimbursement is limited to $250 per defendant, and then only in
capital cases. 249 In Oregon, by contrast, any defendant "eligible
for appointed counsel is entitled to necessary and reasonable fees
and expenses for investigation, preparation and presentation of
the case for trial ... ,"250
Further complicating matters is the general requirement that
judges review and approve experts that defense counsel request. 25 1
Requiring attorneys to consult with judges as to the services that
they are able to provide their clients runs counter to ABA
standards for independence, which seek to ensure that attorneys
representing indigent defendants are "subject to judicial
supervision only in the same manner and to the same extent as
are lawyers in private practice." 252 Certainly a private attorney,
who is not asking the court to reimburse or waive expert witness
fees, would not be required to consult with a judge prior to calling
hearing may, in its discretion, determine that investigative or expert
services or other similar services are necessary to ensure that the
constitutional rights of the defendant are properly protected.
§ 40-14-207(b)
248. See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/113-3(d) (West 2006) (limiting expert
witness pay to $250); MINN. STAT. § 611.21(b) (2006) (limiting expert witness
reimbursement to $1000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7.135 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008)
(limiting expert witness reimbursement to $500).
249. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/113-3(d) (West 2006).
250. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135.055(3) (West Supp. 2008).
251. But see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 21-2-105(2) (2008) (providing that contracts
made with defense counsel will be evaluated when bills are submitted for
reimbursement); WYO. R. CRIM. P. 44(e)(2)(A) (providing that expert witness fees be
approved by the public defender's office before they are incurred). Some of these
proceedings are designated ex parte. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4508 (2007)
("An attorney other than a public defender who acts as counsel for a defendant who
is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert or other services necessary to
an adequate defense in the defendant's case may request them in an ex parte
application addressed to the district court where the action is pending."); N.Y.
COUNTY LAW § 722-c (McKinney 2004) ("Upon a finding in an ex parte proceeding
that investigative, expert or other services are necessary and that defendant ... is
financially unable to obtain them, the court shall authorize counsel . . . to obtain
the services on behalf of the defendant .. "); cf. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82-
83 (1985) ("When the defendant is able to make an ex parte threshold showing to
the trial court that his [or her] sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his [or
her] defense, the need for the assistance of a psychiatrist is readily apparent.").
Other States do not specify procedures for review. See, e.g., WASH. SUP. CT. CRIM.
R. 3.1(f) (stating that a motion for expert witness assistance may be made ex parte);
W. VA. CODE ANN. §29-21-13a(e) (LexisNexis 2008) (stating that expenses for expert
witnesses shall be reimbursed in an amount as the court may approve).
252. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 172, at 13 (discussing Professional
Independence in Standard 5-1.3).
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an expert in his or her client's defense. Although practical
considerations require that indigent defendants are not able to
obtain expert services on demand, 253 excessive judicial oversight
can prevent counsel from zealously defending a client when a
judge controls the resources at counsel's disposal. This is
particularly true when established maximum amounts to pay for
expert assistance are insufficient and require judicial override in
order to secure additional, adequate funding. 254
The Supreme Court's failure to provide states with guidelines
regarding the minimal resources that they must devote to indigent
defense expert assistance allows for woeful inadequacies in the
services available to defendants. 255 States are able to claim that
they provide for indigent defense experts, while in reality funding
is so limited that defense counsel is unable to find experts who will
assist them for such low fees. 256 States can also employ whichever
procedures they see fit to determine whether defendants are
entitled to expert assistance. 257 These unregulated processes can
lead to prejudicial standards that undermine an attorney's ability
to zealously advocate for his or her client as our adversarial
system envisions. 258 Yet again, the Supreme Court's failure to
253. See Giannelli, Right to Expert Assistance, supra note 200, at 1375.
254. See, e.g., supra note 248 (noting statutes that set a limit on the amount a
defendant may receive from the State to pay an expert).
255. See, e.g., State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 784 (La. 1993) (citing trial court
findings that an attorney in a Louisiana first degree murder case had no funds for
expert witnesses); Marcia Coyle, Suit: Death Defense is a Sham, NAT'L L. J., Dec.
21, 1998, at A14 (recounting an incident in which the Florida office represented
death row inmates and relied on the ABA committee formula in requesting $2.9
million to fund expert witnesses and management staff; the legislature
appropriated $854,000).
256. See, e.g., COMM. ON LEGAL SERVICES TO THE POOR IN CRIMINAL MATTERS,
MUTING GIDEON'S TRUMPET: THE CRISIS IN INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN TEXAS
18 (2000), http://www.uta.edupols/moore/indigentflast.pdf (quoting a Dallas
County attorney who "do[esln't take appointments any more because of the pay
rate and the inability to get experts to testify for what the court pays. It is
tantamount to malpractice to accept appointments in Dallas County when the
lawyer pays out of his or her pocket the expenses"); THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, AM.
BAR ASS'N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, A
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA 64 (2004),
http://www.abanet.orgflegalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/va-
report2004.pdf (detailing experiences during site work in which researchers were
told attorneys had trouble finding experts to appear for the low fees authorized by
the state).
257. See Willis, supra note 217, at 1010 (examining various state statutes
provisions for funding expert witnesses and concluding that, in each, "the degree to
which such assistance is granted depends upon the discretion of the trial judge and
upon the judge's definition of necessary") (emphasis in original).
258. See, e.g., State v. Schoonmaker, 176 P.3d 1105, 1116 (N.M. 2008) (finding
that the court's failure to accept an attorney's motion to withdraw after the
defendant was denied funds for expert assistance resulted in the defendant
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provide specific standards undermines the fundamental rights it
purports to recognize.
V. A Twofold Solution to the Lack of Meaningful
Indigent Defense
The Supreme Court's shortcomings in Gideon, Strickland,
and Ake closely parallel each other and stem from similar
omissions and reticence to clarify standards. Resulting
scholarship has tended to treat them as separate from each other,
each existing in a vacuum. This approach is problematic in our
adversarial system of justice. As the Supreme Court has stated in
all three opinions, the point of the Constitution's guarantees in
criminal justice proceedings is to ensure that criminal defendants
have adequate resources to defend themselves and assure fair
trials. 25 9 A defendant who has access to counsel is unable to put
forward the defense he or she is entitled to if counsel has no
resources with which to present expert evidence that goes to the
heart of the case. And a defendant who has compiled evidence is
at a distinct disadvantage if he or she has no effective counsel to
assist in properly presenting that evidence to a factfinder.
In Ake, the Supreme Court recognized that access to expert
witnesses was intertwined with counsel's ability to present an
effective defense when it defined a psychiatric expert's role, in
part, as helping to determine whether certain lines of defense are
available and helping to prepare cross-examination. 260 Rather
than setting a high bar for these symbiotic elements of defense,
however, the Court's jurisprudence has shackled both elements
with excessively harsh standards, unclear guidance for meeting
these standards, and disregard for systemic shortcomings that
receiving ineffective assistance of counsel).
259. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (stating that "mere access to
the courthouse doors does not by itself assure a proper functioning of the adversary
process," and that "a criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds
against an indigent defendant without making certain that he [or she] has access to
the raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense"); Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (holding that "a fair trial is one in which
evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for
resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding," and that "access to
counsel's skill and knowledge is necessary to accord defendants the 'ample
opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution' to which they are entitled" (quoting
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942))); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("[Inn our adversary system of criminal
justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him [or her].").
260. Ake, 470 U.S. at 82.
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enshrine inadequacies. 261 Fortunately, as the Court's failures in
these cases mirror each other, so too do the necessary solutions.
A. Legal Standards
The Supreme Court must begin to rectify its legal
shortcomings by clearly stating that the constitutional provisions
on which Gideon, Strickland, and Ake are founded render the
cases inseparable. In Gideon and Strickland the Court clearly
established that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a
right to counsel against the states. 262 In Ake, however, the Court
grounded its opinion in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, independent of any other constitutional provisions,
explaining that it was not taking the "occasion to consider the
applicability of the Equal Protection Clause, or the Sixth
Amendment .... " 263
This holding is problematic because it embraces a vague
approach to fair trial rights rather than the specific entitlements
enumerated in the Sixth Amendment. The Court could have found
that Ake had a right to a psychiatric expert based on the
Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 264 Its use of
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process, however, provides more
"wiggle-room." 265  The Fourteenth Amendment contains no
itemized list of the rights inherent in due process. 266 As a result,
these rights are largely left to the Justices' determination of what
constitutes a fair trial. Allowing judges to determine due process
rights undermines the requirement of providing "raw materials
integral to the building of an effective defense" 267 by overlooking
the Sixth Amendment's clear statements of fair trial
components. 268 It further ignores the extent to which access to
261. See supra Parts III-IV.
262. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684-85; Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339 (overruling the
Betts v. Brady Court's holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not require a state court to appoint counsel for the defendant).
263. Ake, 470 U.S. at 87 n.13.
264. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his [or
her] favor ... ").
265. Cf. Harris, supra note 202, at 471-72 ("Due process entitled the indigent
defendant not to equality, but to the basic tools of an adequate defense. The
question was no longer what the indigent defendant would receive as a matter of
equal justice, but what a basic, minimal standard of justice required." (footnote
omitted) (emphasis added)).
266. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
267. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77.
268. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing rights to a speedy trial, impartial
2009]
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evidence is entwined with the right to effective assistance of
counsel. Whereas the Court has recognized the fundamental
nature of counsel and specifically incorporated it against the
states, it has not seen fit to specifically incorporate the procedures
that allow counsel to be effective-i.e. the procedures that allow
counsel to present evidence. 269 In order to rectify its less-than-
enthusiastic endorsement of defendants' rights to present expert
witnesses, the Court needs to specify that the Compulsory Process
Clause is incorporated against the states and specifically protects
the defendant's right to receive expert advice and testimony.270
Once the Court has clarified the constitutional provisions
that anchor defendants' trial rights, it must address the deficient
standards that it has established for evaluating those rights. The
Supreme Court's primary obligation should be removing the
"prejudice" prong from its tests for effective assistance of
counsel 271 and vetoing the "fundamental fairness" prong that
lower courts have promulgated to assess entitlement to expert
assistance. 272 Asking appellate courts to determine in hindsight
whether counsel's errors affected a trial destabilizes traditional
notions of burdens of proof and speciously presumes that a
procedurally flawed means can achieve an accurate end.273 In
order to resolve these tensions the Court must promulgate rules
that do not rely on assessing trial outcomes.
The Court's duty in revisiting Strickland is resolving the
direct tension between using "reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms ' 274 as the standard for attorney performance,
and declaring that "[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally
unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a
criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment."275
jury, notice of charges, a chance to confront witnesses, compulsory process to obtain
witnesses, and the assistance of counsel).
269. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 87 n.13 ("[W]e have no occasion to consider the
applicability of the ... Sixth Amendment, in th[e] context [of a defendant's right to
expert assistance].").
270. See Harris, supra note 202, at 508-09.
271. See Gabriel, supra note 136, at 1276-77 (arguing that the Strickland
prejudice inquiry creates an outcome-determinative test that is inconsistent with
the Sixth Amendment and the Court's duty under the Constitution to ensure that
defendants receive fair trials).
272. See Willis, supra note 217, at 1026-28 (arguing that requiring a defendant
to show in advance that an expert witness will affect a trial outcome undermines
the Court's recognition of a defendant's right to participate meaningfully in his or
her defense).
273. See Gabriel, supra note 136, at 1271, 1278.
274. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1985) (emphasis added).
275. Id. at 691 (emphasis added).
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These statements find the Court talking out of both sides of its
mouth. The Court is asserting that counsel should behave
reasonably, but holding that his or her failure to do so is not
necessarily actionable. This standard places the value of finality
over that of accuracy and divorces the ends of a trial from its
means-if a court's post hoc review determines that a defendant
was properly convicted, counsel's failures to participate
appropriately in that result are immaterial. 276
In order to properly protect the right to a procedurally fair
trial, the Court needs to abandon the "prejudice" prong of its
Strickland test. Rather than relying on judges to assess the
results of improperly conducted tribunals, 277 the Court should
reverse its facile treatment of reasonableness 278 and instead adopt
a meaningful definition of the term as the benchmark for judging
counsel's effectiveness. 279 Reasonableness inquiries can reduce
the test for ineffective assistance of counsel to one issue: whether
counsel's actions were unreasonable under contemporary
standards of professional conduct, given the totality of the
circumstances. 28 0  This showing would protect the Strickland
Court's concern that "[r]epresentation is an art"281 that deserves
deference. If a defendant can show that counsel's actions were
unreasonable, this showing should compel a new trial without
reference to the outcome of any previous proceedings, in order to
protect fundamental procedural guarantees under the
Constitution. 282
276. See Gabriel, supra note 136, at 1266.
277. See Lemos, supra note 143, at 1820-22 (arguing that ineffective assistance
of counsel claims often contain incomplete trial records specifically due to counsel's
ineffectiveness in presenting sufficient evidence).
278. See 466 U.S. at 688-89; discussion supra Part IIL.B.
279. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 708 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Strickland majority "has discouraged [judges] from trying to develop more detailed
standards governing the performance of defense counsel ... [and] thereby not only
abdicated its own responsibility to interpret the Constitution, but also impaired the
ability of the lower courts to exercise theirs"); Gabriel, supra note 136, at 1284
(advocating that courts evaluate whether counsel made objectively reasonable
decisions as their sole inquiry for determining effective assistance of counsel).
280. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 712 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I would.., hold
that a showing that the performance of a defendant's lawyer departed from
constitutionally prescribed standards requires a new trial regardless of whether the
defendant suffered demonstrable prejudice thereby."); cf. Gabriel, supra note 136,
at 1284 (proposing a revised rule for determining ineffective assistance of counsel,
in which a defendant "must prove that counsel failed to make decisions that were
objectively reasonable in light of all of the circumstances of the case").
281. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.
282. See Gabriel, supra note 136, at 1284-86 (arguing that denying effective
assistance of counsel is equal to the denial of any counsel).
20091
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In revising the Ake standard the Court can take a similar
approach. First, it must do away with confusing language and
limitations contained in the Ake opinion. 28 3 The Court needs to
clearly affirm that the right to expert assistance extends beyond
psychiatric experts. 28 4  It should also explicitly state that the
standards for expert assistance are not satisfied by "neutral"
experts, but require that each party in a case has access to its own
expert evidence. 28 5
Next, the Court should jettison its "significant factors" and
"basic tools" language. Lower courts applying such tests, as in
Moore v. Kemp, have shown a propensity for undervaluing a
defendant's access to independent expert assistance. 2 6  The
threshold standard in these rules is too high, requiring
defendants to use knowledge that they do not have in advance of
trial in order to project a trial's important issues, 28 7 therefore
offering insufficient access to independent experts. 288
Further, under Ake, courts have an incentive to establish
minimal standards for providing expert assistance. 28 9 They save
government money by setting low standards for the resources an
indigent defendant is due-and for which the government must
pay.290  Too often this calculus fails to take into account the
information that a factfinder needs in order to reach an accurate
result, 291 and the state's "interest in the fair and accurate
adjudication of criminal cases."292  The Court must move away
from the standards that incentivize this "race to the bottom" in
delineating the resources necessary for a defendant to receive a
fair and just trial.
283. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77-79 (1985); see discussion supra Part IV.
284. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
285. See supra notes 230-235 and accompanying text.
286. See supra Part IV.A.2; supra note 234.
287. See supra notes 214-217 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 234-235 and accompanying text.
289. See Harris, supra note 202, at 471-72 (arguing that the Supreme Court in
Ake embraced the "basic tools" approach, which allowed states to focus on the
minimal standards justice requires rather than what a defendant is due as a
matter of equal justice).
290. See Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An
Argument from Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 813-14 ('Trial judges
are largely responsible for allocating (though not setting) Ake budgets. Faced with
limited funding, they [can choose to] read the doctrine narrowly (or disingenuously)
and conclude that any given defendant's request for expert assistance does not
meet Ake's due process standard of assistance .... ).
291. Cf. Givelber, supra note 11, at 1371 ('The Court's most significant rulings
in the Fourth and Fifth Amendment areas tend to reduce rather than increase the
information available to the factfinder.").
292. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 79 (1985).
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Instead of condoning lower courts use of Ake's three factors to
propagate unreasonably high standards for defendants requesting
expert assistance, the Court can require that defendants meet a
threshold showing that the issues for which they are requesting
expert assistance are material to their cases. 293 If a defendant
meets the low threshold standard, he or she should receive funds
to meet with the relevant experts to determine whether the
evidence and possible approaches to presenting it are viable, 294
much as Ake contemplates. 295 Once an expert has had a chance to
review the relevant issues, that assessment can be used to
authorize further funding in areas that are deemed relevant to
findings of reasonable doubt, 296 taking into account the resources
that the prosecution devotes to the case and the seriousness of the
charges.
This low threshold abandons Ake's requirement that a
defendant predetermine an expert's usefulness at trial without
having the expert knowledge necessary to make that
determination. 297 It replaces the lower court's duty to decide
which elements of a defendant's case are "significant factors" that
require experts as "basic tools" to aid the defense, instead asking
the court to determine materiality and germaneness to the
reasonable doubt standard. 298  These inquiries are more in
keeping with ensuring that a defendant "is fairly able to present at
least enough information to the jury, in a meaningful manner, as
293. See Willis, supra note 217, at 1026-27; cf. Harris supra note 202, at 473
(advocating a two-part test for access to expert services, in which the first question
is whether "the issue to which the resource pertains [is] contested").
294. See Giannelli, Right to Expert Assistance, supra note 200, at 1384-85;
Harris, supra note 202, at 522-24.
295. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 82.
[W]ithout the assistance of a psychiatrist to conduct a professional
examination on issues relevant to the defense, to help determine whether
the insanity defense is viable, to present testimony, and to assist in
preparing the cross-examination of a State's psychiatric witnesses, the risk
of an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues is extremely high. With such
assistance, the defendant is fairly able to present at least enough
information to the jury, in a meaningful manner, as to permit it to make a
sensible determination.
Id. But see id. at 83 (stating that an indigent defendant does not have "a
constitutional right to ... receive funds to hire his own [psychiatrist]").
296. See Giannelli, Right to Expert Assistance, supra note 200, at 1385.
297. Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83; see supra notes 214-217 and accompanying text.
298. These standards could be implemented by courts, though concerns for
defense counsel independence could lead independent indigent defense providers or
agencies to make these judgments. See infra text accompanying notes 337-338.
Contra Willis, supra note 217, at 1030-31 (advocating a two-part test wherein a
court considers "the probable value of the expert in reducing risk of an erroneous




to permit it to make a sensible determination."299 They also
temper concerns about costs, by requiring a preliminary showing
of need in order to justify further expenditure for trial. The
threshold standard incorporates the government/individual
balancing aims of the Ake Court's three factors, 300 but also takes
into account the resources that a defendant needs to prepare and
present a defense and the tools that a factfinder needs to render
an accurate verdict.
B. Systemic Standards
Legal standards cannot exist separate from their practical
considerations. Much of the Court's failure in Gideon, Strickland,
and Ake can be traced to unclear rules, but more broadly to a
dearth of instruction on how States must comply with these
rules. 301 The combination of the two shortcomings allows States to
dedicate minimal resources to indigent defense and to judge their
own shortcomings lightly under inadequate case-by-case
standards.
The Supreme Court's inadequacies in setting legal standards
for effective assistance of counsel and expert assistance, and its
failures to address requirements for the systems that provide
these services, track each other closely. Here, too, the solutions
are bound up with one another. In order to appropriately deal
with both, the Court must break its silence on how states can
structure systems to ensure that the services indigents receive can
be presumed satisfactory. 302 Absent clear guidance, there is no
end in sight for state systems that have shown, time and again,
that they do not allocate adequate, consistent resources to indigent
defense. 303
Examples of state deficiencies in providing for indigent
299. Ake, 470 U.S. at 82.
300. Id. at 77 (naming such factors as "private interest," "governmental
interest," and the probable values and risks in allowing or denying access to
psychiatric assistance).
301. See Groendyke, supra note 217, at 386-88 (identifying the roots of the
disparity between prosecution and defense access to experts in the Supreme Court's
silence, in and after Ake, on implementing the right to expert assistance); Taylor-
Thompson, supra note 17, at 1462 (arguing that the Gideon Court "left open the
critical question of how states might develop a coherent system of representation
for indigent individuals charged with crimes").
302. See Effectively Ineffective, supra note 17, at 1733 (contending that courts
must be more aggressive in ordering governments to provide adequate funding and
oversight for indigent defense delivery systems).
303. See GIDEON REVIEWED, supra note 152 (giving an overview of historically
lax funding and standards for indigent defense services across the country).
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defense are rampant throughout the United States.304 Many
indigent defense providers have sought to litigate these shortfalls
on a case-by-case basis. In 1993, the Louisiana Supreme Court
found that indigent defendants in Criminal District Court were
entitled to a "rebuttable presumption ... that [they] ... are
receiving assistance of counsel not sufficiently effective to meet
constitutionally required standards"30 5 due to the public defender's
office having, among other things, an excessive workload and no
funds for expert witnesses. 30 6 The court held that prosecutions
could not go forward until the defendants in question received
reasonably effective assistance of counsel. 30 7 Other courts have
also ordered that their jurisdictions address defense resources or
offer defendants relief. 30 8 In 1999, the Fulton County (Georgia)
Board of Commissioners agreed to a Consent Order in a class
action filed on behalf of indigent defendants who had not received
counsel between their bond hearings and arraignment. 30 9 The
Order established new programs to ensure that Fulton County
provided defendants with appropriate representation and
mandated that the county adequately fund them.3 10 This is not
the only jurisdiction in which courts have stepped in to oversee
appropriate management in indigent defense systems. 311 Courts
have also held that inadequately funding indigent defense violates
the right to effective assistance of counsel, 312 and that it is
304. Id.; see supra notes 162-167, 182-184 and accompanying text.
305. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 791 (La. 1993).
306. Id. at 784.
307. Id. at 791-92.
308. See, e.g., State v. Hanger, 706 P.2d 1240, 1242 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)
(upholding the trial court's dismissal of charges when the state and county refused
to pay constitutionally and statutorily mandated defense costs); Lavallee v. Justices
in Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895, 912 (Mass. 2004) (limiting criminal
cases against defendants to forty-five days when no counsel is available); State v.
Young, 172 P.3d 138, 144 (N.M. 2007) (ordering a stay of prosecution of death
penalty cases against defendants when counsel was inadequately compensated).
309. Stinson v. Fulton County Bd. of Comm'rs, Consent Order, No. 1-94-CV-240-
GET (N.D. Ga. 1999).
310. Id. at 4 (including such changes as increased personnel, division of
workload, and in-house education programs).
311. See State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Okla. 1990) (holding that a state
statute violated the Oklahoma Constitution as applied because it did not afford
attorneys adequate opportunities to demonstrate that they should not be forced to
accept indigent defense appointments, and because it enshrined an arbitrary and
unreasonable compensation scheme that could result in an unconstitutional taking
of an attorney's property (i.e. his or her time, effort, and personal funding put into a
case)).
312. See, e.g., New York County Lawyers' Ass'n v. State, 763 N.Y.S.2d 397, 419
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (declaring that "Defendant State of New York has a
constitutional and statutory obligation to ensure that qualified assigned private
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unconstitutional to require attorneys to pay for defense services
from their own funds. 31 3
While these examples of successful litigation in individual
cases may seem to provide hope for indigent defense delivery, they
are ultimately inadequate in dealing with widespread, systemic
shortcomings. 31 4  Judicial rulings are limited in time and
circumstances. These cases bring much-needed attention to the
plight of indigent defense systems, but their legacies are short-
lived. As soon as a court renders its opinion, the criminal justice
system continues its work and encounters new stresses and
strains. Such unpredictable and uncontrollable influences as
inflation and crime rates can continue to erode indigent defense
providers' ability to perform their jobs, and render a one-time
judicial decision moot almost the minute it is handed down.3 15
The most promising long-term solution to chronic indigent
defense crises is not judicial, but legislative: 316 States should seek
a level of parity in their prosecutorial and defense functions by
funding the two in relation to each other. In 1999, the country's
100 most populous counties spent an estimated 1.2 billion dollars
on indigent defense. 31 7 They spent approximately 38.8 billion
dollars on other criminal justice costs, including police, corrections,
and courts. 318 In a country whose criminal justice system operates
under the presumption that all defendants are innocent until
proven guilty, and requires States to provide services for
defendants to present their cases and demonstrate reasonable
doubt as to their guilt, it is inconsistent that indigent defense
counsel are available and able to provide meaningful and effective representation
to children and indigent adults in New York City," and that "failure to increase the
rates paid to assigned private counsel ...has created a severe and unacceptably
high risk that children and indigent adults are receiving inadequate legal
representation in New York City in violation of the New York and United States
Constitutions").
313. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 465 A.2d 1214, 1217 (N.H. 1983) (stating that
"lawyers have no more obligation to pay the needed expenses of a criminal defense
... than any other class of citizens ... to require them to do so would raise serious
due process issues," and that "failure to reimburse an attorney who spends his [or
her] own funds to purchase the reasonably necessary tools of defense is a taking of
his [or her] financial resources which violates the State and Federal
Constitutions").
314. But see Lemos, supra note 143, at 1823 (proposing that remedying systemic
defects in indigent defense should be addressed in civil suits).
315. See Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the
Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 249 (2004).
316. See id. at 223 ("Judicial rulings[l ... reach will remain tentative and their
staying power weak. In the long run, legislatures ... must embrace parity if it is to
become a meaningful part of their funding habits." (footnote omitted)).
317. Indigent Defense Statistics, supra note 185.
318. Id.
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services receive only an estimated 3% of criminal justice funds. 31 9
The comparison becomes starker when considering that eighty
percent of defendants qualify for indigent defense services. 320 But
the Supreme Court to this point has written of equality between
defendants before the courts, 321 not equality between the defense
and prosecution.
In order to guide legislatures in adequately funding indigent
defense, the Court should reframe the argument for providing
defense funds, and base it on ensuring that defendants have
commensurate resources with prosecutors. 322  The ABA
recommends such a framework. 323 Some States have embraced
this construction and do provide for levels of parity in public
defender salaries.3 24 But defender salary parity is only part of the
equation. Prosecutors and public defenders should receive support
services at roughly equal levels, as well. These services should
encompass access to expert witnesses, investigators, and forensic
testing. Often, prosecutors benefit from the services of police
investigators or state experts in other departments (e.g., mental
health experts at state hospitals and laboratory technicians at
state crime labs) whose costs are paid by the state, but do not come
out of prosecution budgets. 325  Neglecting to address these
disparities enshrines systemic disadvantages for defendants.
319. Id.
320. WALLACE & CARROLL, supra note 176, at i.
321. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("[Olur state and
national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and
substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in
which every defendant stands equal before the law." (emphasis added)).
322. See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 17, at 1483-84 (asserting that the
Supreme Court in Gideon could have used its opinion to advocate for state
mindfulness of prosecution funding in setting defense budgets).
323. Compare ABA STANDARDS, supra note 172, at 53 (stating in Standard 5-4.1
that, when a state provides indigent defense in a defender system model, funding
should be commensurate with counterparts in prosecutorial offices) with NLADA,
Guidelines, supra note 172, at 8-9 (supporting, in Standard 3.2, defense attorney
compensation that is "professionally appropriate when analyzed or compared with
the compensation of the private bar" when states provide indigent defense under a
defender system model).
324. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-293(h) (West 1958) ('The salaries paid
to public defenders, assistant public defenders and deputy assistant public
defenders in the superior court shall be comparable to those paid to state's
attorneys, assistant state's attorneys and deputy assistant state's attorneys in the
various judicial districts in the court"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-2-518 (1994) (stating
that "any increase in local funding for positions or office expense for the district
attorney general shall be accompanied by an increase in funding of seventy-five
percent (75%) of the increase in funding to the office of the public defender in such
district for the purpose of indigent criminal defense.").
325. See Wright, supra note 315, at 235-37.
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The challenge is in how to bring about lasting improvements.
As Robert Kennedy opined, "The poor man charged with crime has
no lobby."326 It is difficult to bring political pressure to bear on
providing more services for defendants, who many view as guilty
anyway. Further, these individuals are seriously disadvantaged in
raising the issue themselves, as many convicted criminals are not
permitted to vote. 327 The court challenges that have succeeded, 328
while insufficient in and of themselves, are a start to raising
awareness. Another tactic is for individual attorneys to bring
challenges. The ABA recommends that attorneys decline to accept
new cases if taking them on would lead to an excessive
workload, 329 and defense attorneys could also raise issues with
their unions or within their offices about pay disparity between
themselves and prosecutors. 330
Any of these tactics, however, will be difficult to utilize
because of the varied systems of providing indigent defense
counsel and assistance among states. The greatest hope lies in
establishing independent public defender organizations for each
state that are charged with administering indigent defense. 331
The ABA advocates these systems 332 because they provide for
attorneys to develop expertise, are positioned to provide counsel
early in the adjudicative process, and are centralized in a way that
enables them to mount coordinated efforts to improve criminal
justice within their jurisdictions. 333 In addition, such systems
could be represented as politically advantageous to legislatures
326. LEWIS, supra note 57, at 211 (quoting Robert Kennedy).
327. See Angela Behrens, Voting-Not Quite a Fundamental Right? A Look at
Legal and Legislative Challenges to Felon Disenfranchisement Laws, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 231, 231 (2004) (identifying convicted felons as the largest collective group
unable to vote in the United States).
328. See supra notes 305-313 and accompanying text.
329. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441 (2006)
(defining ethical responsibilities of a public defender in regard to individual
workload).
330. See, e.g., Trish Hollenbeck, Lawyers See Different Pay Rates from County:
County Paying Experienced Public Defenders Each About $10,000 Less Than Newly
Hired Deputy Prosecutor, NORTHWEST ARK. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2008, available at
http://www.nwanews.com/nwat/News/71164 (detailing public defenders' efforts to
raise issues of salary disparity with local budget committee); cf. Wright, supra note
315, at 262 ("If... budget decisions become associated with ... public ideals about
competitive balance and equity among employees, criminal defendants might reap
the incidental benefits.").
331. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 172, at 6-8 (stating in Standard 5-1.2,
which relates to the advantages of a public defender system, that "[t]he primary
component in every jurisdiction should be a public defender office").
332. Id. at 7-8.
333. Id. at 7.
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looking to efficiently allocate resources, since defender systems
could develop centralized resources and draw on them throughout
the jurisdiction. These systems should include investigators, and
possibly experts, who are available for consultation.334
Defender systems also offer hope for attorneys developing
and enforcing standards in their defense services. Defender
systems, because of their ability to coordinate and oversee system-
wide performance, are uniquely positioned to promulgate and
impose standards on the attorneys in their service. 335 These
standards can address such critical areas as caseload, training,
and timely appointment. In addition, defender systems benefit by
fulfilling one key standard in their very nature: they are
independent from the judiciary.336 Independence allows defense
counsel to determine the tools needed to mount a defense and to
zealously represent clients without being beholden to judicial
oversight in those assessments. 337 The judiciary and the defender
system can work together, in conjunction with the legislature, to
address concerns on a system-wide basis and incorporate solutions
into defender policies, rather than inefficiently making decisions
on a case-by-case basis. Such standardization keeps judges from
making prejudicial determinations about how a defense attorney
should pursue a case and limiting the zealous advocacy to which
defendants are entitled.338
Conclusion
Gideon, Strickland, and Ake are riddled with legal
shortcomings that deny indigent defendants access to fair trials by
undermining their rights to effective assistance of counsel and
expert assistance. Current tests that assess the services that
defendants receive require courts to evaluate trial outcomes, and
334. Giannelli, Right to Expert Assistance, supra note 200, at 1416; see also PAUL
B. WICE, PUBLIC DEFENDERS AND THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 22 (2005)
("Without the availability of adequate staff, even the best-intentioned, intelligently
organized defender office cannot offer effective legal representation for their
clients.").
335. Cf. Taylor-Thompson, supra note 17, at 1487 ("The task of identifying and
defining the fundamentals of representation is well within the expertise of
defenders in collaboration with their clients.").
336. See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra note 135, at i ('The most important
role of a successful state oversight body or commission is to insulate the defense
function by providing a measure of independence to the indigent defense system
from political and judicial influence."); Giannelli, Right to Expert Assistance, supra
note 200, at 1416 (discussing the public defender system as a means of ensuring
judge neutrality and keeping judges from being responsible for public funds).




in the process shortchange the Constitution's procedural
guarantees designed to ensure accurate results. But the Court
refuses to revisit these tests. The 2008 denial of a certiorari
petition in Pennsylvania v. Mallory3 39 represents the most recent
opportunity for the Supreme Court to clarify its holdings on
indigent defendants, and joins a long line of cases in which the
Court has refused to make good on indigents' constitutional rights.
The Court compounds its failure to adequately evaluate
individual instances of insufficient indigent defense by neglecting
to address systemic shortcomings in indigent defense delivery.
Failing to provide states with any guidance for structuring their
defense systems means that the Court has consigned public
defense to a constant state of crisis. In 2008, numerous states
faced budget shortfalls, lawsuits over caseloads, and public
defenders refusing to take cases. 340 Yet the highest court in the
land has remained conspicuously silent on state obligations to
establish systems that provide presumptively effective assistance
of counsel and access to expert assistance to ensure fair defenses
for indigent defendants.
In order to fulfill its constitutional duty, the Court must
revisit its Gideon, Strickland, and Ake holdings. It needs to
recognize that effective assistance of counsel and expert resources
to present a defense are inextricable, and acknowledge their roots
in the Sixth Amendment. Once it has laid these constitutional
foundations, the Court must make two essential changes to
existing legal standards in order to ensure that these rights are
operative. First, moving from a trial assessment model to a
reasonableness model for evaluating effective assistance of counsel
can ensure that the process by which a defendant is found guilty is
fair, and is conducted without compromising constitutional
safeguards. Second, adopting a low threshold for determining the
necessity of expert assistance solves the problem of projecting
which issues will be important at trial. It likewise provides
defendants with tools to evaluate defense strategies before
receiving excessive resources.
Finally, in order to address systemic standards that obstruct
defendants' access to fair trials, the Supreme Court must break its
silence on how states organize their indigent defense systems.
Addressing such solutions as prosecutor/defender parity and the
advantages of a public defender system can encourage legislatures
to adopt proactive measures to adequately address indigent
339. Pennsylvania v. Mallory, 129 S. Ct. 257 (2008).
340. See supra notes 160-167, 305-313 and accompanying text.
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defense services and minimize courts' need to rule on systemic
shortcomings on a case-by-case basis.
The Supreme Court's choice to continually ignore the
fundamental and constant shortcomings of its indigent defense
jurisprudence represents an abdication of its duty to ensure the
rights that indigent defendants are guaranteed under the
Constitution are not mere platitudes. The Supreme Court has a
duty to ensure that these rights are operative, and to protect the
principles that Americans value and expect in their criminal
justice system. Until the Supreme Court revisits the legal and
systemic standards necessary to safeguard these rights, we will
never realize the promises of Gideon, Strickland, and Ake.

